Complexity of syntactical tree fragments of Independence-Friendly logic by Barbero, Fausto
ar
X
iv
:1
61
0.
03
40
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
1 O
ct 
20
16
Complexity of syntactical tree fragments of
Independence-Friendly logic (DRAFT)
Fausto Barbero
July 21, 2018
Abstract
In 1986 ([2]), Blass and Gurevich proved that any non-linear Henkin
quantifier can be applied to a quantifier-free first-order formula in such
a way that the resulting sentence characterizes an NP-complete problem.
In 2014 Sevenster ([31]) proved a more general result for regular quantifier
prefixes of Independence-Friendly (IF ) logic; he showed that these prefixes
can express (in the sense described above) either 1) only FO problems or 2)
also NP-complete problems. The latter class is constituted by 2a) prefixes
that mimic non-linear Henkin quantifiers, and 2b) prefixes that encode
game-theoretical phenomena of signalling. Furthermore, the dichotomy
result yielded a new sufficient (and recursive) criterion for recognizing IF
sentences that are equivalent to first-order sentences.
In the present paper we develop the machinery which is needed in order
to extend the results of Sevenster to non-prenex (regular) IF sentences.
This involves shifting attention from quantifier prefixes to a (rather gen-
eral) class of synctactical trees. Instrumentally, we explicitate and prove
a number of equivalence rules for incomplete synctactical trees.
We partially classify the fragments of IF logic that are thus deter-
mined by synctactical trees; in particular, we identify three synctactical
structures that are neither signalling nor Henkin, and yet express concepts
that are beyond the reach of first-order logic.
1 Introduction
Starting with Fagin’s theorem ([10]), the enterprise of descriptive complexity
has systematically developed correspondences between classes of computational
complexity, on one side, and logics and their fragments, on the other. One of the
main connections between the two fields (and which our paper shall focus on)
is given by the problem of model checking: given a fixed formula ψ expressed
in some logical language, and a class K of finite structures, the problem asks
whether an input structure M ∈ K satisfies ϕ (M |= ϕ). Furthermore, the
choice of opportune encodings of input instances, and of the class K, allows
reducing decision problems, that may seem to be completely unrelated to logic,
1
into model checking problems. A decision problem is described by a sentence ϕ
if there is an encoding of the instances of the problem onto K, so that M |= ϕ
if and only if M encodes a “yes” instance of the problem.
Fagin’s theorem amounts to the statement that the NP problems (those
solvable in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine) are exactly
those that can be described by sentences of existential second-order logic (ESO).
Given the amount of unsolved issues about the internal structure of NP, it was a
natural choice to investigate the descriptive complexity of ESO fragments. The
approach most often taken was the study of synctactical fragments determined
by specific quantifier prefixes: given a quantifier prefix ~Q, one can study the
fragment of prenex ESO sentences of the form ~Qψ, ψ being a quantifier-free
formula. To the best of our knowledge, most of the results obtained in the
literature have taken, up to now, the form of classifications of prefix classes up to
reduction closure; that is, for each fragment one aims to find an upper bound (all
sentences in the fragment decribe problems of a certain complexity class C) and
an explicit description of at least one difficult problem of the class C (typically,
a problem that is C-complete under some kind of significant reduction). In
the literature, we find a systematical classification of the quantifier prefixes
of relational ESO over graph structures, wich was begun in [13] and recently
completed in [32]: from it, it emerged that prefix fragments of relational ESO
can capture (up to reduction closure) the complexity classes FO, L, NL, and NP.
In [7], a similar systematical analysis of relational ESO on string structures has
been carried out, showing the surprising dichotomy that prefix fragments either
fall in REG or they express NP-complete problems (the result is remarkable
because it is known that REG is a small class, REG ⊂ NP). In general, see [8]
for an overview of the results on relation ESO (up to 2010). For what regards
functional ESO, prefix classes seem to be of lesser interest, since it is known
([15]) that the minimal interesting prefix, ∃f∀x, already allows expressing NP-
complete problems.
Now, it is interesting that many systems of logic of imperfect information
(for example, positive Henkin quantification [2], Independence-Friendly logic
[27], Dependence logic [34], Inclusion logic [11], Independence logic [14]) are
expressively equivalent to ESO logic, and thus they capture NP. So, under the
perspective of descriptive complexity, these logics can be seen as alternative
cartographies of the NP class. It is thus natural to study the descriptive com-
plexity of fragments of these logic; and it is perhaps to be hoped that these
kind of investigations lead to a better understanding of the fine structure of
(functional and relational) ESO. In the present paper we will focus on the sys-
tem of Independence-Friendly (IF ) logic1 (first developed in [17] and [29]; see
[27] and [3] as references). IF logic is first-order logic (with logical constants
∃, ∀,∨,∧,¬) enriched with slashed quantifiers of the forms (∃v/V ) and (∀v/V ),
where V is a finite set of variables (slash set). The former can be read as “there
exists a v independent from (the variables in) V ”; the latter has a less intu-
1See [6] for recent results and a survey on the descriptive complexity study of other logics
of imperfect information.
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itive appeal. The slash set added to a universal quantifier has no impact at
all on the evaluation of the truth of a sentence; but it does for what regards
the evaluation of falsity (IF logic can be thought of as a three-valued logic). It
should be thought of as a constraint limiting the search for a counterexample.
In this paper we will mostly focus on truth only. The main results about the
descriptive complexity of IF logic can be found in a recent paper of M. Seven-
ster ([31]), building on earlier works of Blass and Gurevich on positive Henkin
quantification ([2]). Blass and Gurevich showed that (unless one applies special
restrictions to the range of variables) all Henkin prefixes define NP-complete
problems. Sevenster gave a dichotomy result for regular2 IF logic: IF prefixes
are either equivalent to first-order ones (and thus capture the small complexity
class FO) or they allow expressing NP-complete problems. The latter can hap-
pen in two different situations: first, in case the IF prefix mimicks a Henkin
quantifier; and secondly, in case the IF prefix contains a signalling sequence.
Such a neat and minimal classification of regular IF prefixes gives us the
courage to investigate more complex fragments of regular IF logic; those that
are characterized by synctactical tree prefixes. We will focus on trees that do
not contain atomic formulas nor negation symbols (positive initial trees). The
study of these kinds of synctactical structures has some formal similarities with
the study of restricted Henkin quantifiers ([2]), partially ordered connectives
(see e.g. [30]) and Boolean Dependence Logic ([35]), but yet it seems not to
be easily reducible to any of these. Furthermore, we want to stress that the
study of the synctactical structures of IF logic considered in the present pa-
per is not easily reducible to the study of quantifier prefix classes of existential
second-order logic. To make a concrete example, we will study the fragment
of IF sentences of the form ∀x(∀y(∃u/{x})ǫ1(x, y, u) ∨ ∀z(∃v/{x})ǫ2(x, z, v)),
with ǫ1(x, y, u), ǫ2(x, z, v) quantifier-free; by a well-known Skolemization pro-
cedure, sentences of this form are equivalent to the functional ESO sentences
∃f∃g∀x∀y∀z(ǫ1(x, y, f(y)/u) ∨ ǫ2(x, z, g(z)/v)). Yet, sentences of this form do
not fully cover the fragment of ESO corresponding to the quantifier prefix
∃f∃g∀x∀y∀z, because not all quantifier-free formulas ǫ(x, y, z) are equivalent
to quantifier-free formulas of the form ǫ1(x, y, f(y)/u) ∨ ǫ2(x, z, g(z)/v); each
disjunct is a two-variable formula3, and notice also that there are restrictions
on the form of terms: all occurrences of f in this last formula are applied to y,
and all occurrences of g are applied to x.
Sevenster’s results give an answer to the question: what new and interesting
dependence patterns are expressible in regular, prenex IF logic, that are not
explicitly expressible in the (positive) logic of Henkin quantifiers4? And the
2A sentence is said to be regular if the same variable is never requantified; e.g., ∀xP (x) ∨
∀xQ(x) is regular, but ∀x∀xP (x) is not.
3See [35] and [21] for the state-of-the-art of the study of finite variable fragments of IF
logic.
4The positive logic of Henkin quantifiers is the set of sentences of the form

∀x11 . . . x1n ∃y1
...
...
∀xm1 . . . xmn ∃ym

ψ, with ψ first-order. Here each yi depends on xi1 . . . xin and
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answer was: intransitive, signalling patterns, and nothing else. In this paper we
work with a similar question in mind. That is: in IF logic the slashed quantifiers
are not required (as in the positive logic of Henkin quantifiers) to occur in an
initial quantifier prefix, but they might occur within the scope of conjunctions
and disjunctions; do then new interesting dependence patterns arise, that have
not the form of Henkin quantification, nor of signalling?
In the present paper we give a partial classification of the (positive initial)
tree fragments (up to reduction closure). Analyzing these kinds of fragments,
at least two questions suggest themselves: 1) are there other ‘ingredients” in
regular IF logic, aside from Henkin quantification and signalling, that allow
expressing concepts beyond first-order? 2) Shifting attention from quantifier to
tree prefixes, does the FO/NP-C dichotomy still hold (under the restriction that
tree prefixes do not contain atomic formulas and negations)? The results in the
present paper give a YES answer to the first question: we found three sync-
tactical patterns (Sections 8.1, 9.1 and 9.2) that are not Henkin nor signalling,
and yet express higher-order concepts. These patterns are strenghtenings of the
signalling by disjunction pattern which was individuated in some examples of
T.M.V. Janssen ([20]). For what regards question number 2), we do not yet
have a definite answer; all the tree fragments considered up to now have turned
out to be either in FO or to define NP-complete problems.
After Section 2, in which IF logic is reviewed, and Section 3, in which
synctactical trees are introduced, two sections (4 and 5) are dedicated to the
development of a calculus of tree prefixes, by means of which we can extend some
of Sevenster’s results by purely synctactical means. Probably, the reader who
is only interested in the complexity results can skip these sections and consult
them as needed. The methods developed therein are used in section 6 in order
to prove that a large fragment of IF logic (which contains all the FO quan-
tifier prefix fragments, and other tree prefixes), the fragment of modest trees,
has first-order complexity. In the same section, two classes of “signalling by
disjunction” trees are introduced: the generalized Henkin and the coordinated
ones. In section 7 we generalize Sevenster’s extension lemma, showing that
taking extensions of synctactical trees preserves properties such as NL,P,NP-
hardness; and we use it to show that all trees that contain Henkin or signalling
patterns are NP-complete. Section 8 divides the generalized Henkin fragment
into four subclasses; of these, one is shown to contain only NP-complete trees,
which can express the SAT problem; for the other three classes, we give partial
results, showing that many of the trees they contain are in FO. Section 9 con-
siders a first kind of coordinated trees, which are classified into three subclasses,
all shown to be NP-complete (the first two define SAT, and the third one the
SET SPLITTING problem). We also show that the trees in the third class can
express 2-COLORABILITY (a logspace, non first-order problem). Section 10
takes briefly into account the remaining coordinated trees (of “second kind”).
on no other variable.
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2 The semantics of IF logic
Independence-Friendly sentences are usually given a meaning by means of cer-
tain semantic games; the slash sets are interpreted in the games as constraints of
imperfect information. We will not need this viewpoint here, and so we will not
review it; the reader may consult [27], Chapters 3-4 for details and motivation.
It was shown by Hodges ([18],[19]) that a certain compositional semantics,
known as team semantics, properly extends the game-theoretical semantics giv-
ing a meaning also to open formulas. Team semantics can be thought as a
technical instrument for the study of the game-theoretical semantics; but we
must say that, although a number of alternative semantics have been shown to
extend properly the game-theoretical semantics (for example, the lax and strict
interpretations of logical operators considered in [9]5, or the 1-semantics of [28]),
there are results (Theorems 4.13 and 4.28 in [27]) which strongly suggest that
team semantics might be the correct way of extending game-theoretical seman-
tics. In any case, we have no need to make any commitment about these matters:
we are satisfied with the fact that replacement of formulas that are equivalent
in an appropriate team-theoretical sense is an operation which preserves truth
values of sentences (Theorem 5.18 of [27]).
In team semantics, formulas are interpreted over sets of assignments of a
common variable domain (teams), and thus their “meanings” are sets of teams.
Indeed, intuitively the notion of independence has no meaning over single as-
signments, and this intuition has been assessed by a combinatorial argument
([4]). We write M,X |= ϕ to say that the formula ϕ is satisfied by the team X
on model M ; we say that a sentence ϕ is true (M |= ϕ) if M, {∅} |= ϕ. Dual
notions of negative satisfaction and falsity are represented with the symbol |=−.
We present the compositional clauses in the style of [33].
Def 2.1. A team on a structure M is a set of assignment such that, for all
s, s′ ∈ X, dom(s) is a finite set of variables, and dom(s) = dom(s′) =: dom(X).
A team X is suitable for a formula ψ in case FV (ψ) ⊆ dom(X).
Def 2.2. Given a team X over a structure M and a variable v, the duplicated
team X [M/v] is defined as the team {s(a/v)|s ∈ X, a ∈M}.
Given a team X over a structureM , a variable v and a function F : X →M ,
the supplement team X [F/v] is defined as the team {s(F (s)/v)|s ∈ X}.
Def 2.3. Given two assignments s, s′ with the same domain, and a set of vari-
ables V , we say that s and s′ are V -equivalent, and we write s ∼V s′, if
s(x) = s′(x) for all variables x ∈ dom(s) \ V .
Given a team X, a structureM and a set V of variables, a function F : X →M
is V-uniform if s ∼V s′ implies F (s) = F (s′) for any s, s′ ∈ X.
5An annotation for lovers of bibliographical precision: although actually the strict/lax
distinction appears in an earlier paper [11], it is acnowledged by Galliani himself (page 4,
footnote 4 of his paper) that the idea comes from an earlier draft of [9].
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Def 2.4. We say that a suitable team X satisfies (resp. negatively satisfies) an
IF formula ϕ over a structure M , and we write M,X |= ϕ (resp. M,X |=− ϕ)
in any of the following circumstances:
• M,X |= R(t1, . . . , tn) if M, s |= R(t1, . . . , tn) in the classical sense for
every s ∈ X; M,X |=− R(t1, . . . , tn) if M, s 6|= ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) for every
s ∈ X
• M,X |= ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) if M, s |= ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) for every s ∈ X
• M,X |= ¬ψ if M,X |=− ψ
• M,X |= ψ ∧ χ if M,X |= ψ and M,X |= χ
• M,X |= ψ ∨ χ if there are Y, Z ⊆ X such that Y ∪ Z = X, M,Y |= ψ,
and M,Z |= χ
• M,X |= (∀v/V )ψ if M,X [M/v] |= ψ
• M,X |= (∃v/V )ψ if M,X [F/v] |= ψ for some V -uniform function F :
X →M
• Dual clauses, obtained interchanging ∧ with ∨ and ∀ with ∃, define induc-
tively the relation |=−.
In the present work, we will mainly operate at the level of team semantics;
but often, instead of the semantical clauses, we will make use of some synctac-
tical equivalence rules which have been developed in [3]. Notice that IF logic is
three-valued (sentences that are neither true nor false are called undetermined),
so that there is more than one reasonable candidate for the notion of equivalence
of IF sentences. Here we will consider mainly the notion of truth-equivalence.
Def 2.5. Two IF sentences are truth-equivalent (≡) if they are true in the
same structures (i.e., ϕ ≡ χ if for all structures M , M |= ϕ⇔M |= χ).
Most equivalence rules of IF logic, however, hold for a stricter notion of
equivalence:
Def 2.6. Two IF sentences are strongly equivalent (≡∗) if they assume the
same truth value (true, false or undeterminate) on each structure (i.e., ϕ ≡∗ χ
if for all structures M we have M |= ϕ⇔M |= χ and M |=− ϕ⇔M |=− χ).
We will need a well known fact about the expressivity of IF sentences:
Proposition 2.7. ([27], Theorems 6.10, 6.16) On the sentence level, IF logic
is equiexpressible with existential second order logic. Thus, by Fagin’s theorem
([10]), the set of IF sentences characterizes the complexity class NP.
For what regards equivalence of open formulas, many possibilities have been
considered in the literature; probably the simplest option would be to consider
two formulas ψ, θ equivalent if in all structures they are satisfied by the same
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teams, provided that we only consider teams whose variable domain contains
FV (ψ) ∪ FV (θ). However, many important equivalence rules of IF logic are
context-dependent; they hold only if some kinds of restrictions are imposed on
the contexts in which the formulas may appear; that is, these rules only hold
if the formulas do not occur in the scope of certain quantifiers. Thus, it is in
many occasions more convenient to consider notions of equivalence relativized
to contexts. This has been been done in two different ways in the literature: 1)
in the style of Caicedo, Dechesne and Janssen ([3]), specifying which variables
should not appear in the context, and 2) in the style of Mann, Sandu and Sev-
enster, expressing equivalence in a fixed context. The latter has the advantage
of involving only a finite domain, but it leads to more cumbersome formulations
of the equivalence rules. We stick here to the former option.
Def 2.8. Let ψ, θ be IF formulas. A team X is said to be suitable for ψ and
θ if dom(X) ⊇ FV (ψ) ∪ FV (θ).
Def 2.9. Let ψ be an IF formula, Z a finite set of variables. Then ψ is Z-
closed if FV (ψ) ∩ Z = ∅.
Def 2.10. Let ψ, θ be IF formulas, let Z be a finite set of variables. We say
that ψ and θ are Z-equivalent, and we write ψ ≡Z θ6, if they are Z-closed
and, furthermore, M,X |= ψ ⇔ M,X |= θ and M,X |=− ψ ⇔ M,X |=− θ for
all structures M and for all teams X that are suitable for ψ and θ and such that
dom(X) ∩ Z = ∅.
If we have an explicit description {z1, z2, . . . , zn} of Z, we can also write,
for brevity, ψ ≡z1z2...zn θ.
So, the subscripts to the equivalence symbols mean that the equivalence only
holds for those teams whose domain does not contain any of the subscripted
variables; and also, in order to avoid triviality, the subscripted variables must
not occur free in the formulas under consideration. This notion of equivalence
of formulas works well because of the following two facts:
Proposition 2.11. 1) ([3], remarks on page 22) If ϕ and χ are IF sentences,
then, for any finite set Z of variables, ϕ ≡Z χ if and only if ϕ ≡ χ.
2) ([3], Lemma 6.16) More generally, if ϕ and χ are Z-closed IF formulas,
then ϕ ≡Z χ if and only if ϕ ≡Z∩Bound(ϕ)∩Bound(χ) χ.
Proposition 2.12. ([3], Theorem 6.14) If ϕ, ψ, ψ′ are IF formulas, Z a finite
set of variables, ϕ′ is obtained from ϕ by replacing a subformula occurrence of
ψ with ψ′, and ψ ≡Z ψ′, then ϕ ≡Z ϕ′.
3 Synctactical trees: basic definitions
We define here the class of synctactical trees which is of our interest – we are
seeking for the simplest possible generalization of what a quantifier prefix is if
6We omit the star ∗ from the Z-equivalence symbol in order to have a simpler notation.
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we do not restrict attention to prenex sentences. This requires including in the
prefixes also connectives, and taking into account the binary ramifications they
induce in the structure of formulas. This class of trees (the positive initial trees)
has already been introduced elsewhere ([1]), but here we will require some more
precision in the formal details.
Def 3.1. A synctactical tree is a finite tree whose nodes are (occurrences of)
atomic formulas, negations, conjunctions, disjunctions or quantifiers (with their
slash sets), and which respects the following constraints: 1) atomic formulas are
leaves (i.e., they have no successors)
2) each negation has at most one successor
3) each binary connective has at most two successors
4) each quantifier has at most one successor.
It should be clear in what sense to each IF sentence we can associate its
synctactical tree, and in the following we will always indentify a formula with
its tree. On the contrary, there are many synctactical trees (according to the
above definition) that are not the synctactical tree of any formula, for example:
∀x
∃y
∀x
∨
B(x)
(∀x/{z})
∨
A(x) ¬
∀x
∨
∧
B(y) C(z)
∨
∃x
A(x)
∃y
Def 3.2. A positive initial tree is a synctactical tree which contains no oc-
currence of atomic formulas nor of negations.
Said otherwise, a positive initial tree can be obtained from the synctactical
tree of some negation normal IF formula by removing from it all nodes that
correspond to atomic formulas and negations (a formula is said to be negation
normal if negation symbols occur only in front of atomic formulas). The word
positive refers to the fact that we do not allow negation symbols to occur in
the tree, while the word initial refers both to the fact that none of the paths
end with an atomic formula and to fact that, if we think the tree as obtained
removing nodes from the synctactical tree of a formula, whenever a node is
deleted also all nodes below it are removed. This generalizes the fact that a
quantifier prefix is an initial segment of the synctactical tree of a formula; the
parallel is made more explicit in the following two definitions (in which we use
standard set-theoretical terminology for the description of trees).
Def 3.3. A dense open subset Y of a tree T is Y ⊆ T such that
∀y ∈ Y ∀t ∈ T (t  y → t ∈ Y )
(where  is the partial ordering of the tree in which the root is the minimal
element).
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Def 3.4. An IF formula ϕ begins with T if T is a dense open subset of the
syntactical tree of ϕ.
Def 3.5. Given an IF formula ϕ, we define the tree prefix of ϕ, and denote
it as PTr(ϕ), the maximal positive initial tree contained in the synctactical tree
of ϕ.
(We could equally well define the tree prefix of ϕ to be the maximal positive
initial tree contained in the synctactical tree of ϕ that does not intersect any
quantifier-free subformula of ϕ, since it is reasonable to expect that the connec-
tives in quantifier-free subformulas do not yield any expressive power beyond
first-order; this is the kind of prefixes that we will consider in the rest of the
paper).
Notice that, for example, we can say that the formula ϕ = ∀x(A(x)∨¬B(x))
begins with the tree
∀x
∨
[ ] ¬
B(x)
even though this tree is not positive initial (it contains a negation, and also an
atomic formula). Instead, PTr(ϕ) is
∀x
∨
[ ] [ ]
In these graphical representations, we have added some “gap” nodes [ ]
whenever there were less than two successors to a connective, or no successors to
a quantifier; the gaps mark the points in which the tree may potentially be filled
with (the synctactical tree of) an IF formula. This convention grants us with a
more comfortable linear notation for synctactical trees (e.g., we might write the
tree above as ∀x([ ]∨ [ ])), and it is made precise by the forthcoming definition
of path of a (possibly incomplete) synctactical tree; this does not coincide with
the usual notion of paths of a tree from set theory, as maximal suborders (it
would, if we had included as possible elements of the trees occurrences of “the
gap”). Notice indeed that a connective followed by a single gap
...
∨
[ ] ...
is not the end point of a maximal suborder, but we may want to attach a
formula in that gap. All we need to do is to associate to each of our synctactical
trees T another tree, Tˆ , which is identical to T except for the fact that it has a
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“gap node” in all position where T has gaps; the “paths” of T can be identified
with the maximal suborders of Tˆ .
Notation 3.6. Given a formula ϕ (resp. a quantifier prefix ~Q, a synctactical
tree T ), we denote the relation of superordination between pairs of logical oper-
ators as ≺ϕ (resp. ≺ ~Q, ≺T ). So, for example, ∀x ≺ϕ ∃y means that (a certain
occurrence of) ∃y occurs within the scope of (a certain occurrence) of ∀x.
Two quantifier prefixes R, S can obviously always be concatenated in order
to obtain a longer prefix RS; this notation can sometimes be extended to trees:
Notation 3.7. Whenever R is a finite linearly ordered set whose last element is
a gap, and S is a tree, we can unambiguosly denote as RS the concatenation of
R and S, that is, the tree obtained removing the last element of R and replacing
it with the tree S.
Def 3.8. Let R = R′{O} be a linear suborder of a tree T which is an initial
segment of it (that is, d <T e and e ∈ R imply d ∈ R).
We then define the arity of R in T , arT (R).
In case O is a connective,
arT (R) =


2 if O is a maximal element of T
1 if O has exactly one successor
0 otherwise.
In case O is a quantifier,
arT (R) =
{
1 if O is a maximal element of T
0 otherwise.
Def 3.9. Given a synctactical tree T , let Tˆ be the tree obtained attaching as
new leaves, to each initial segment R of T , a number of occurrences of the gap
[ ] equal to the arity of R in T .
For example, if T is
∀x
∨
∃y
then Tˆ will be the much more transparent
∀x
∨
[ ] ∃y
[ ]
Notice that, since connectives in IF logic are commutative, it is not really
important whether we place gap nodes on the left or on the right of an existing
node.
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Def 3.10. Given a tree T , we will call any maximal linear suborder of Tˆ a path
of T . The set of these objects will be called Path(T ).
Notice that each path of T corresponds to a gap node of T ′, and vice versa;
and that linear suborders ending with an occurrence of an atomic formula are
not paths in the sense defined here.
The main results of [31] worked properly only for a restricted class of quan-
tifier prefixes, the sentential class. We will often need to impose a somewhat
stronger condition on our tree prefixes: regularity, in the sense of [3].
Def 3.11. A synctactical tree T is regular if the following hold:
1) No variable occurs both free and bound in T
2) If a quantification (Qv/V ) occurs in T , then it is not subordinated to any
quantification of the form (Qv/W ).
In particular, we denote as Reg(IF ) the set of regular IF formulas. Notice
that sentences automatically satisfy condition 1).
Furthermore, we say that a tree T is strongly regular if it satisfies 1) plus the
following:
2’) No variable is quantified more than once in T .
4 Synctactical reductions of trees
In [31], the analysis of low complexity quantifier prefixes is based on a somewhat
intuitive notion of equivalence of prefixes. We develop here something which is
analogous; but, perhaps a bit surprisingly, the needed notion for trees is not an
equivalence relation, but an order relation, that we shall simply call reduction.
Def 4.1. Let ψ be an IF formula. The set Bound(ψ) of bound variables of
ψ is defined as usual. The set FV (ψ) of free variables is defined as for first-
order logic, except for the clause FV ((Qv/V )χ) := FV (χ) \ {v} ∪ V . Similar
definitions can be given for trees, paths, etc.
Notation 4.2. If R is a tree/path/formula/etc., we denote as FV (R) and
Bound(R) the set of free variables, respectively of bound variables, occurring
in R. We write V ar(R) for FV (R)∪Bound(R). We denote as QFree(IF ) the
set of quantifier-free IF formulas.
In [31], two quantifier prefixes R, S are defined to be equivalent if, whenever
the same quantifier-free formula ψ is postfixed to them, one obtains truth-
equivalent formulas Rψ ≡ Sψ. We have not yet specified what we mean by
equivalence of (open) formulas; in any case, we will not need, here, this degree
of generality. But one can instead make the weaker requirement that two prefixes
are equivalent in case Rψ ≡ Sψ whenever Rψ and Sψ are regular sentences.
This is the idea behind definitions 4.3-4.7. However, if R,S are trees, we will
rather require that Rψ ≡ Sψ whenever Rψ is a regular sentence. We make
a requirement only on R, not on S; the asimmetry of our notion of reduction
stems from here. The reason for this choice is the following: there are seemingly
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innocuous equivalence rules between formulas that actually increase (or, in the
opposite direction, decrease) the expressive power of a synctactical tree (this
even happens if we restrict attention to first-order logic). One such example
is given by the extraction of quantifier rules. Let us think of the trees R =
∀x(∃y[ ] ∨ [ ]) and R′ = ∀x∃y([ ] ∨ [ ]). R′ is actually more expressive than
R, since its rightmost gap can be filled (if we want to obtain a sentence) only
with formulas having x, y as free variables – while the rightmost gap of R can
be filled only with formulas having just x as free variable.
The first of the following definitions generalizes the operation of postfixing
a formula to a quantifier prefix. Here we may need to attach many formulas,
one for each gap in the tree.
Def 4.3. Let T be a synctactical tree. We will call any function e : Path(T )→
Reg(IF ) a completing function for T . A completing function can be:
weak: if ran(e) ⊂ QFree(IF )
sentential: if, for each R ∈ Path(T ), FV (e(R)) ⊆ Bound(R).
regularity-preserving: if, for each R ∈ Path(T ), we have Bound(e(R)) ∩
Bound(R) = ∅.
nice: if it is both sentential and regularity-preserving.
Notice that weak completing functions are automatically regularity-preserving.
Def 4.4. We call eˆ(T ) the formula obtained attaching e(R) at the end of R, for
each R ∈ Path(T ).
Similarly, if S ⊆ T is a tree, we denote by eˆ(S) the smallest subformula of
eˆ(T ) which contains S.
It should be clear that, if T is a regular tree, then asserting that e is sentential
amounts to saying that eˆ(T ) is a sentence; and that if T is regular and e is
regularity-preserving, then eˆ(T ) is a regular formula.
Example 4.5. 1) Consider the simplest possible example of a positive initial
tree: a quantifier prefix. So, let T = ∃y(∀x/{y}); then Tˆ = ∃y(∀x/{y})[ ],
which is still linear. There is only one gap, so only one path, which is Tˆ itself;
so, a completing function for T is just a function from the singleton set {Tˆ} to
Reg(IF ). Set for example e(Tˆ ) = (∃z/{x})Q(x, z). Applying this completing
function to T , you obtain the formula eˆ(T ) = ∃y(∀x/{y})(∃z/{x})Q(x, z). No-
tice that we have FV (e(Tˆ )) = {x} ⊆ {y, x} = Bound(Tˆ ): e is sentential. And
indeed eˆ(T ) is a sentence. We also have Bound(Tˆ ) ∩ Bound(eˆ(T )) = {y, x} ∩
{z} = ∅, so that e is regularity preserving. And indeed eˆ(T ) is a regular formula.
Putting things together, e is a nice completing function, but it is not weak, be-
cause e(Tˆ ) contains the quantifier (∃z/{x}). Instead, f(Tˆ ) := P (x, y)∧Q(x, y)
is nice and also weak.
Let instead g(Tˆ ) = (∃u/{x})Q(x, z). This function is regularity-preserving
but not sentential: FV ((∃u/{x})Q(x, z)) = {x, z} 6⊆ {y, x} = Bound(Tˆ ). And
indeed, gˆ(T ) = ∃y(∀x/{y})(∃u/{x})Q(x, z) is a regular formula, but not a sen-
tence, because z is free in it.
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Let h(Tˆ ) = (∃y/{x})Q(x, y). This is sentential but not regularity preserv-
ing: Bound(Tˆ ) ∩ Bound(g(Tˆ )) = {y, x} ∩ {y} = {y} 6= ∅. Indeed, hˆ(T ) =
∃y(∀x/{y})(∃y/{x})Q(x, z) is a sentence, but it is not regular, because there
are two quantifications of y, one superordinated to the other.
Finally, let k(Tˆ ) = ∀y(∃y/{x})Q(x, z). This is not a completing function,
because k(Tˆ ) is not a regular formula.
2) Consider again a linear tree, but this time of the form T ′ = ∃y(∀x/{y})∨.
The corresponding tree with gap nodes is Tˆ ′ = ∃y(∀x/{y})([ ] ∨ [ ]), which is
not a linear tree anymore. And it has two paths (call A the path containing
the leftmost gap, and B the other one). A completing function for T ′ will be a
function {A,B} → Reg(IF ), for example{
j(A) = ∃zP (y, z)
j(B) = Q(y, z)
which is not weak because of j(A), not sentential because of z occurring free
in j(B), and it is regularity preserving because neither j(A) nor j(B) contain
quantifications over x or y. The result of the completion is the sentence jˆ(T ′) =
∃y(∀x/{y})(∃zP (y, z)∨Q(y, z)).
If we want to define reductions between tree prefixes, we face one more
difficulty: while with linear prefixes R,S it is obvious what it means to say
“when R,S are prefixed to the same formula”, here we should say that two
trees T, U are “completed in the same way by the same completing function”.
But 1) no function is a completing function for both T and U , unless T = U ,
so we will need to establish some kind of correspondence between completing
functions of different trees, and 2) the locution “in the same way” makes any
sense only after we have fixed a bijection between the gaps in T and the gaps
in U ; this bijection will establish which pairs of gaps must be filled with the
same formula. This also means that we will manage to define reductions only
between pairs of trees which have the same number of gaps. Noticing that we
have defined the paths of a tree so that paths and gaps are in a natural bijection
(each gap is the last element of a path, and each path ends with a certain gap),
we can proceed and define equivalence without any reference to gaps.
Def 4.6. Given two trees T, T ′, a bijection ι : Path(T ) → Path(T ′) and
a completing function e for T , we define a completing function eι for T
′ (a
function(Path(T ′)→ Reg(IF )) by the clauses eι(ι(P )) = e(P ), where P varies
in Path(T ).
Def 4.7. A reduction between two synctactical trees T and T ′ is a bijection
ι : Path(T ) → Path(T ′) such that, for all fine completing functions e, eˆ(T ) ≡
eˆι(T
′).
We say T is reducible to T ′ if there is an reduction between them.
Whenever the name of the equivalence is not specified, we will abuse notation
and denote both e and eι as e, unless this can be a source of confusion.
Notice, again, the asymmetry of reductions, given by the fact that we impose
niceness only on e, and not on the corresponding eι.
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As was mentioned in the introduction, the complexity notions studied in
[2] and [31] are expressed in terms of “postfixing all possible quantifier-free
formulas” to a quantifier prefixes. This leads us to a still weaker notion of
reduction.
Def 4.8. A weak reduction ι between two synctactical trees T and T ′ is a
bijection between the paths of T and the paths of T ′ such that, for all fine7,
weak completing functions e, eˆ(T ) ≡ eˆι(T ′). We say T is weakly reducible to
T ′ if there is a weak equivalence between them.
The notion of weak reduction will turn out to be flexible enough for our
purposes; its most important feature is that it does not decrease the complexity
of a tree, while at the same time it allows the formulation of a number of proof-
theoretic rules (to be develop in the following section, up to a prenex form
theorem) that would fail for mere reductions.
The precise connection with complexity theory will be explicitated in section
6; for now, let us just see how reductions relate to a measure of expressive power:
Def 4.9. To any IF sentence ϕ, we associate the class Fϕ = {M |M finite, M |=
ϕ} of its finite models. Given a synctactical tree T , we define the complexity
class of T :
C(T ) = {Feˆ(T )| e weak completing function for T }.
If we have C(T ) = C(T ′), resp. C(T ) ⊆ C(T )... then we say that T is as
complex as T ′, resp. T is less complex than T ′...
Theorem 4.10. If there is a reduction or a weak reduction from tree T to tree
T ′, then C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′).
Proof. If ι is a (weak) reduction, it means that, in particular, for each weak
completing function e for T there is a corresponding weak completing function
eι for T
′, so that eˆ(T ) ≡ eˆι(T ′); that is, such that Feˆ(T ) = Feˆi(T ′). This
means that, for each weak completing function e of T , Feˆ(T ) ∈ C(T
′), that is,
C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′).
This result holds for both kinds of reductions, but only the weak reductions
are in abundant number enough for our purpose; this will emerge in the next
section.
5 Prenex transformations and other formal rules
for regular trees
A number of the results proved in [31] depend on manipulations of quantifier
prefixes that preserve an opportune notion of equivalence of prefixes; similarly,
7The requirement of ι-fineness, here, is a bit redundant, since weak completing functions
are always regularity-preserving.
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here, we develop proof-theoretical rules for the manipulation of trees that either
preserve the complexity of trees or are weak reductions. We also prove, along
the way, a sort of prenex form theorem: each tree can be turned into a prenex
one without losing complexity. This result with not be used in the following,
but it is perhaps of some intrinsic interest.
Turning equivalence rules for sentences into reduction rules for initial trees
is not a trivial matter, as it may be thought. Problems arise for example with
rules for the extraction of quantifiers, and rules for the renaming of variables;
we recall them below in a form for formulas; they are notational variants of (the
first half of) Proposition 5.37 and 5.35 from [27]:
Proposition 5.1. 8 Suppose u is not quantified in ψ. If v does not occur in
(Qu/U)ψ, then
(Qu/U)ψ ≡uv (Qv/U)Subst(ψ, u, v).
where Subst(ψ, u, v) is the formula obtained by replacing, in ψ, all free occur-
rences of u with v.
Proposition 5.2. Let ψ and χ be IF formulas. If u occurs neither in χ nor in
U , then
(Qu/U)ψ ◦ χ ≡u (Qu/U)(ψ ◦ χ/{u}).
where χ/{u} is the formula obtained adding the variable u to all the slash sets
of χ.
(The variable u must be added to the slash sets of the right disjunct in
order to prevent it to be used as a source of signals – which could be used to
circumvent the restrictions imposed by slash sets. See [3].)
These rules are problematic, because they are not “local”, in the sense that
they depend on global conditions: that some variable does not occur in a certain
subformula, that a whole subformula is slashed. Since a syntactical tree may be
extended in many ways to a well-formed IF sentence – perhaps also attaching to
the conjuncts/disjuncts some formula containing the variable which is mentioned
in the global conditions – the extraction and renaming rule do not produce
“equivalent” syntactical trees. We show it with an example (involving irregular
trees).
Consider the tree QxQ′y([ ] ∨ Q′y[ ]) (where Q,Q′ are quantifiers). One
may be tempted to state it is equivalent to QxQ′yQ′z([ ] ∨ [ ]), to be obtained
applying renaming followed by extraction of quantifiers. But, for example, in
general QxQ′y(P (x) ∨ Q′yP (y)) 6≡ QxQ′yQ′z(P (x) ∨ P (y)); yet, setting P (y)
in that position is allowed in both trees, since it is inserted in the scope of Q′y
quantifiers. Notice, furthermore, that we cannot aim at a prenex transformation
by renaming the outmost Q′y quantifier, since the renaming rule requires y not
to occur bound in the scope of Q′y.
8A note of warning. This proposition is nothing else than Theorem 6.12 of [3]. If the reader
confronts our formulation with the rule stated in that paper, he might think that we have
forgotten a clause; that we should have specified that u must not be in U . Yet, this is already
implied by uv-closedneess: the formulation in [3] was redundant.
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It seems clear that the pathological aspect of these kinds of examples lies
in the irregularity of the trees involved, and that we may expect the extraction
and renaming rules to hold for regular trees. However, regularity is not enough
to account for the fact that the slash sets of a certain subformula should be
extended, when performing extraction of quantifiers in IF sentences. This is
the reason why the quantifier extraction rule for trees only holds as a weak
reduction (if χ is a quantifier-free formula, then χ = χ/{u}, so that adding
slashed variable to the quantifiers of the tree is sufficient).
Def 5.3. Denote with Subst(R, u, v) the tree which is obtained from the tree
R replacing all free occurrences of u in R with v. Here, by a subtree of R
we mean a suborder which is constituted by all the elements a of R such that
r ≺ a, for a fixed r ∈ R. If b ≤R c, the closed interval A = [b, c]R is the
set {x ∈ R|b ≤R x ≤R c}. We omit indices if they are clear from the context.
If there are two distincts trees T, T ′ and S occurs as a subtree of both T, T ′,
we will abuse notation and refer to both subtrees as S (unless there is risk of
ambiguity).
Theorem 5.4. Suppose two regular synctactical trees T, T ′ differ only for one
subtree, which is S = (Qu/U)R in T and S′ = (Qv/U)Subst(R, u, v) in T ′.
Suppose v does not occur in S and u /∈ U . Then C(T ) = C(T ′).
Proof. Let c, d, c′, d′ be the roots of T, S, T ′, S′, respectively. We define ι :
Path(T ) → Path(T ′) as the identity on paths which do not intersect S; if
instead P is a path of the form [c, d]B, for some linear order B, define ι(P ) =
[c′, d′]Subst(B, u, v). This is clearly a well-defined bijection.
Let e be a weak completing function for T . We want to find a completing
function f for T ′ such that eˆ(T ) ≡ fˆ(T ′).
For each P ∈ Path(T ) that intersects S, let f(ι(P )) = Subst(e(P ), u, v);
otherwise, let f(ι(P )) = e(P ). Function f is weak, since e is (and thus it is
regularity-preserving). The condition for sententiality obviously holds for paths
that do not intersect S′; if instead ι(P ) intersects S′, we have Bound(ι(P )) =
(Bound(P )−{u})∪ {v} ⊇ (FV (e(P ))−{u})∪ {v} = FV (f(P )), where, in the
inequality, we used the fact that e is sentential. We want to show that eˆ(S)
and fˆ(S′) satisfy the assumptions of Prop. 5.1, that is: 1) u is not quantified
in eˆ(R), 2) v does not occur in eˆ(S), and 3) fˆ(R′) = Subst(eˆ(R), u, v).
The condition 1) follows from the fact that u is not quantified in R (by
regularity of T ) nor in e(P ), for any P ∈ Path(T ) (since e is weak).
Condition 2) follows from the fact that, by the hypothesis, v does not occur
in S; and furthermore, by the fact that v does not occur in e(S) (it occurs not
as quantified, because e is weak; and not as free, since e is sentential).
Condition 3) holds by the definitions of S′ and f , also taking into account
the fact that the e(P )s do not contain quantifications over u.
Applying Prop.5.1, we obtain eˆ(S) ≡uv fˆ(S′). Substitution of {u, v}-equivalent
formulas (Prop. 2.12) yields then eˆ(T ) ≡uv fˆ(T ′). Since e and eι are sentential9,
9We could obtain that e(T ) ≡ eˆι(T ′) without using sententiality; thus, the present result
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it follows that eˆ(T ) and fˆ(T ′) are sentences. So, it is legitimate to apply part
1) of Prop. 2.11 and obtain eˆ(T ) ≡ fˆ(T ′). Since e was arbitrary among weak,
nice completing functions, we may conclude that C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′).
To obtain the opposite direction, just observe that, if we define the tree R′ =
Subst(R, u, v), then S = (Qu/U)Subst(R′, v, u). Furthermore, since u ∈ U , and
by regularity u /∈ Bound(R), u does not occur in S′. So, a completely simmetric
argument applies.
Given a tree S, we denote as S/{u} the corresponding tree in which u has
been added to all slash sets of quantifiers. Coherently with earlier notations,
(Qu/U)S1 ◦ S2 will denote the tree whose root is a binary connective ◦, below
which are attached two subtrees (Qu/U)S1 and S2. Instead, in order to avoid
confusion about precedence of operators, we will sometimes enclose descriptions
of trees in angular parenthes; for example, we will denote as (Qu/U)〈S1◦S2〉 the
tree whose root is (Qu/U), below which is attached ◦, below which are attached
two subtrees S1 and S2.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose two regular synctactical trees T, T ′ differ only for one
subtree, which is S = (Qu/U)S1 ◦ S2 in T and S′ = (Qu/U)〈S1 ◦ 〈S2/{u}〉〉 in
T ′. Suppose u does not occur in U nor S2. Then T is weakly reducible to T
′.
An analogous result holds for trees of the form S1 ◦ (Qu/U)S2.
Proof. Let
c be the root of T
c′ be the root of T ′
d be the root of S1 as a subtree of T
d′ be the root of S1 as a subtree of T
′
f be the root of S
f ′ be the root of S1 ◦ S2/{u}
Define the function ι : Path(T ) → Path(T ′) to be the identity on paths
which do not intersect S; paths of the form [c, d](Qu/U)B, with B ⊆ S1, must
be sent to [c′, d′]B; paths of the form [c, f ]C, with C ⊆ S2, must be sent
to [c′, f ′]〈C/{u}〉 (if it happens that S1 = S2/{u}, we specify that the above
mentioned copy of C/{u} is the one which is attached to ◦ on the rightmost
node).
Let e be any weak, nice10 completing function for T . We must verify that
eˆ(S) and eˆι(S
′) satisfy the hypotheses of Prop.5.2. These amount to: 1) u
does not occur in eˆ(S2), 2) u does not occur in U , and 3) eˆι(S2/{u}) =
eˆι(S2/{u})/{u} (while it is obvious that all slash sets in S2/{u} contain u,
we need a proof that this still holds for eˆι(S2/{u})).
should also hold for equivalence relations between trees which take into account open formulas
(the same can not be said for the forthcoming theorem on extraction of quantifiers). The
argument reads as follows: by regularity, u and v are not quantified superordinated to S, S′,
and from this it follows that u, v /∈ Bound(eˆ(T )) ∩ Bound(eˆι(T ′)); so, we can apply Prop.
2.11,2) .
10Notice that, since the completing functions considered are weak, we never need to make
explicit mention, in this proof, of the regularity-preserving property.
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1) Since T, T ′ are regular, u is not quantified superordinated to S, S′ and
by the assumptions, it is not quantified in S2. So, since e is sentential, i.e.,
for any P ∈ Path(T ) we have FV (e(P )) ⊆ Bound(P ), we can conclude that
u /∈ FV (e(P )). Furthermore, since e is weak, u /∈ Bound(e(P )). In conclusion,
u /∈ V ar(eˆ(S2)).
2) That u is not U , is one of our hypotheses.
3) Since e is weak, also eι is, which means that there are no quantifiers in
eι(ι(P )) for any P ∈ Path(T ) . Thus, eˆι(S2/{u}) = eˆι(S2/{u})/{u}.
Then we can apply Prop. 5.2 to get eˆ(S) ≡u eˆι(S′). Substitution of equiv-
alents (Prop. 2.12) yields eˆ(T ) ≡u eˆι(T ′). Now eˆ(T ) is a sentence, because
e is sentential. But observe also that, for any P ∈ Path(T ), we have, in this
particular correspondence, V ar(eι(P )) ⊆ Bound(P ) ⊆ Bound(ι(P )). So, also
eˆι(T
′) is a sentence. Thus we can use Prop. 2.11 to conclude eˆ(T ) ≡ eˆι(T ′).
Since we proved this for any nice, weak completing function of T , we have that
T weakly reduces to T ′.
We can also prove a strong regularization theorem for regular trees.
Theorem 5.6. For every regular tree T there is a strongly regular tree T ′ such
that C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′); if T is positive initial, we can require also T ′ to be such.
Proof. Let T be a regular tree, let u be a variable which is quantified more than
once, and let (Qu/U) be a quantifier over u which occurs with maximum depth
in T . Call (Qu/U)S the subtree beginning with this occurrence of (Qu/U).
Let v be a new variable. Call T ′ the tree obtained replacing (Qu/U)S with
(Qv/U)Subst(S, u, v). By Theorem 5.4, C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′). Notice also that, since
v did not occur in T , this replacement does not create new instances of irregu-
larity. Repeat until no variable is quantified twice.
Since no atomic formulas nor negations are added, the process preserves the
property of being positive initial.
Also forming a prenex form does not decrease complexity:
Theorem 5.7. For any regular tree T there is another regular tree AB in prenex
normal form (i.e., A is a quantifier prefix and B does not contain quantifiers)
such that C(T ) ⊆ C(AB).
Proof. By Theorem 5.6 we can assume that T is strongly regular. Thanks to
strong regularity, any subtree of the form (Qu/U)S1 ◦S2 is such that u does not
occur in S2 nor in U . Let T
′ be the tree that differs from T only in that the
subtree (Qu/U)S1 ◦S2 is replaced with (Qu/U)〈S1 ◦〈S2/{u}〉〉. Then, Theorem
5.5 guarantees that C (T ) ⊆ C (T ′). The operation preserves strong regularity,
since it preserves both the number of quantifiers and the number of distinct
bound variables. Repeat until the quantifiers form a prefix.
We will need some more rules for trees: a stronger extraction rule that has
the advantage of not transforming any first-order quantifier into an IF one; a
distribution rule, and a quantifier swapping rule. We state here the versions for
IF formulas.
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Def 5.8. Given an IF formula ψ, we define ψ|v to be the formula obtained
adding the variable v to all nonempty slash sets of ψ; and similarly for sync-
tactical trees.
Proposition 5.9. (A special case of Theorem 8.3 of [3]) If u does not occur in
ψ nor U , then:
(Qu/U)ϕ ∧ ψ ≡u (Qu/U)(ϕ ∧ ψ|u)
and similarly for disjunctions.
We list two more useful equivalence rules, distribution of universal quantifiers
(see [27], 5.23) and quantifier swapping ([27]):
Proposition 5.10.
1) ∀u(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡u ∀uϕ ∧ ∀uψ.
2) ∃u(ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡u ∃uϕ ∨ ∃uψ.
Proposition 5.11. Let Q,Q′ be either existential or universal quantifiers. Then:
(Qu/U)(Q′v/V ∪ {u})ψ ≡uv (Q
′v/V )(Qu/U ∪ {v})ψ.
(Notice that, in this logic, adjacent quantifiers of the same kind are not
always allowed to commute: for example, notice that in the left member of the
above formula we require u to occur in the slash set of v.)
And now we translate these rules into the language of trees.
Theorem 5.12. Suppose two regular synctactical trees T, T ′ differ only for one
subtree, which is S = (Qu/U)S1 ◦ S2 in T and S′ = (Qu/U)〈S1 ◦ 〈S2|u〉〉 in T ′.
Suppose u does not occur in U nor S2. Then T is weakly reducible to T
′. An
analogous result holds for S = S1 ◦ (Qu/U)S2.
Theorem 5.13. Suppose two regular synctactical trees T, T ′ differ only for one
subtree, which is S = Qu(S1 ◦ S2) in T and S′ = QuS1 ◦QuS2 in T ′. Then T
is weakly reducible to T ′, and:
1) if Q = ∀ and ◦ = ∧, then C(T ) = C(T ′)
2) if Q = ∃ and ◦ = ∨, then C(T ) = C(T ′)
Theorem 5.14. Suppose two regular synctactical trees T, T ′ differ only for one
subtree, which is S = (Qu/U)(Q′v/V ∪ {u})R in T and S′ = (Q′v/V )(Qu/U ∪
{v})R in T ′. Then T is weakly reducible to T ′, and C(T ) = C(T ′).
Theorem 5.12 can be proved in the same way as 5.5; the proofs of 5.13 and
5.14 are quite trivial, since the corresponding rules for formulas hold without
any global requirement on formulas.
Finally, we look at a tree rule which is specific of IF quantification.
Theorem 5.15. Suppose two regular synctactical trees T, T ′ differ only for one
quantifier, which is (∃v/V ) in T and ∃v in T ′; suppose furthermore that all
variables in V are existentially quantified. Then T is weakly reducible to T ′,
and C(T ) = C(T ′).
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Proof. A proof of the analogous claim for truth equivalence of formulas was
given in [31], Lemma 12, and C(T ) = C(T ′) follows easily from it. The weak
reduction is obtained identifying each path of T either with itself (if the path
does not contain (∃v/V )) or with a corresponding path of T ′ which differs only
in that (∃v/V ) is replaced with ∃v.
Summarizing: the variant rule preserves complexity, but is not a weak reduc-
tion; the extraction rules are weak reductions, but do not preserve complexity
classes; distribution of universals over conjunctions, quantifier swapping and the
last IF rule are weak reductions and preserve complexity classes.
6 IF trees of low complexity
We assume the reader has a minimum of familiarity with notions of complex-
ity theory, in particular reductions, hardness, completeness and the complex-
ity classes FO, L, NL, P and NP. In the following, when we speak of NP-
completeness, we are thinking of completeness up to polynomial reductions. It
is known that the following inclusions hold:
FO ⊆ AC0 ⊂ TC0 ⊆ L ⊆ NL ⊆ P ⊆ NP
where AC0 and TC0 are two classes of computation by circuits (AC0: problems
decidable by boolean circuits of unbounded fan-in and constant depth, TC0:
problems solvable by threshold circuits of constant depth. AC0 ⊂ TC0 is one
of the few strict inclusions that are known of within NP; it has the interesting
consequence that first-order formulas cannot even express all L problems.
We study the complexity of IF positive initial trees, in the sense given by
the following definitions (given along the lines of [2]):
Def 6.1. The model-checking problem for an IF sentence ϕ is the problem of
establishing whether M |= ϕ when a (representation of a) finite structure M is
given as input.
Def 6.2. We shall say that a regular positive initial tree T is in complexity
class K if for all weak, sentential completing functions e the model-checking
problem for eˆ(T ) is in K (equivalently: if C(T) ⊆ K).
We say that T is K-hard, or that it encodes a K-hard problem, if there is
at least one weak, sentential completing function e such that the model-checking
problem for eˆ(T ) is in K (equivalently: if C(T) ∩K-hard 6= ∅).
If T is in K and it is K-hard, we say it is K-complete (equivalently: if
C(T) ∩K-complete 6= ∅ and C(T) ⊆ K).
Theorem 4.10 above states that weak reductions do not make the complexity
class of a tree smaller; so, if T ′ is in K and T reduces to T ′, we can also conclude
that T is in K.
We are now in the condition to enunciate in our formalism the dichotomy
result given by Sevenster ([31], Theorem 29), restricted to the case of IF regular
prefixes:
20
Proposition 6.3. Every regular IF prefix either encodes an NP-complete prob-
lem, or it is in the class FO of first-order definable problems.
This result can be stated in a stronger form, saying 1) that the FO prefixes
are equivalent, in a rather strong sense, to first-order prefixes, and 2) giving a
complete (and effective) classification of the NP-complete vs. the FO prefixes.
We define analogous classes for trees.
Def 6.4. We say that a quantifier (Qy/Y ), occurring in a regular formula or
a regular tree, depends on (Q′x/X) (or, shortly, depends on x) if (Q′x/X) ≺
(Qy/Y ) and x /∈ Y . If any of these two conditions does not hold, we say it does
not depend on (Q′x/X).
We define two “path properties” mimicking and generalizing the properties
defined in [31]. They identify paths which mimick the behaviour of Henkin
quantifiers ([16]) and paths which contain signalling phenomena ([18], [20]).
Def 6.5. A path of a positive initial tree is Henkin if it contains quantifiers
(∀x/X), (∃y/Y ), (∀z/Z), (∃w/W ) such that:
1) (∃y/Y ) depends on (∀x/X) but neither on (∀z/Z) nor (∃w/W )
2) (∃w/W ) depends on (∀z/Z) but neither on (∀x/X) nor (∃y/Y ).
Def 6.6. A path of a positive initial tree is signalling if it contains quantifiers
(∀x/X), (∃y/Y ), (∃z/Z) such that:
1) (∃y/Y ) depends on (∀x/X)
2) (∃z/Z) depends on (∃y/Y ) but not on (∀x/X).
Def 6.7. Given any path property P, we say that a tree T has property P if
there is a path of T which has property P.
Of course, not every interesting property of a syntactical tree is a path
property; for example
Def 6.8. A synctactical tree T is first-order if all of its slash sets are empty.
Def 6.9. A synctactical tree T is primary if it is neither Henkin nor signalling.
Then, the classification result of Sevenster can be summarized thus (restrict-
ing attention to regular prefixes):
Proposition 6.10. 1) Henkin and signalling (regular) IF prefixes are NP-
complete 2) Primary regular IF prefixes are in FO.
The apparatus developed so far allows us to (partially) extend the result on
primary prefixes to trees. We define three new classes of trees:
Def 6.11. A tree T is generalized Henkin if it contains logical operators
∀x, ∀y, (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) such that:
1) ∀x ≺T (∃u/U), (∃v/V )
2) u depends on x but not on y nor v
3) v depends on y but not on x nor u.
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Condition 1) allows excluding some first-order trees, such as (∀x∃u[ ]) ∨
(∀y∃v[ ]), from this class of trees. Notice that this class includes all Henkin
trees, but also others such as ∀x(∃u[ ]) ∨ (∀y(∃v/{x})[ ]), in which the two
existentials occur in distinct branches of the tree. Notice also that if such a
tree is not Henkin, then there is a connective ◦ which is superordinated to both
(∃u/U), (∃v/V ) and which occurs below ∀x. We then say that ∀x, ∀y, (∃u/U), (∃v/V )
and ◦ form a generalized Henkin pattern.
Def 6.12. A synctactical IF tree is coordinated if it contains logical constants
(∀x/X),∨, (∀y/Y ), (∀z/Z), (∃u/U), (∃w/W ) such that:
1) (∃u/U) depends on y and ∨, but not on x, z, w
2) (∃w/W ) depends on z and ∨, but not on x, y, u
3) ∨ depends on ∀x, and (∃u/U), (∃w/W ) depend on ∨.
In case (∃u/U), (∃w/W ) occur in different disjuncts below ∨, we say the coor-
dinated tree is of first kind; otherwise, we say it is of second kind.
Def 6.13. A regular tree is modest if it is neither signalling nor generalized
Henkin nor coordinated.
Lemma 6.14. Let T be a regular, modest tree. Let ◦ be a binary connective
occurring with maximal depth in T . Suppose below ◦ an existential quantifier
(∃d/D) occurs. Then, by quantifier swapping, we can transform T into a tree
T ′ of the same complexity, and such that, if a universal quantifier ∀c occurs
between ◦ and (∃d/D), then d depends on c.
Proof. Suppose there is a ∀c such that ∀c ≺T ◦ ≺T (∃d/D) and c ∈ D. We
show how to push ∀c below (∃d/D) by quantifier swapping. First of all, notice
that there are no connectives between ◦ and (∃d/D); so, we can rearrange this
part of the tree in Hintikka normal form ([27], Theorem 5.45), as a sequence
of universals followed by a sequence of existentials. This does not alter the
dependence relations between quantifiers.
Secondly, one can push ∀c below the other universal quantifiers, until it is
immediately above the sequence of existential quantifiers.
If the sequence of existential quantifiers begins with quantifiers that are
independent of ∀c, swap them above ∀c.
Then, below ∀c and before ∃d, find the first pair of existential quantifiers
(∃u/U), (∃v/V ) such that: 1) (∃u/U) is immediately above (∃v/V ), 2) u de-
pends on c, and 3) v does not depend on c. Now, if v depended on u, then
∀c, (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) would form a signalling sequence, contradicting the hypoth-
esis that T is modest. So, v is independent of u; thus, we can swap (∃v/V )
above (∃u/U); then, for the same reason, we can push it above all the ex-
istential quantifiers that were between ∀c and (∃u/U); and finally, above ∀c.
Iterating this process, one can push above ∀c all the existential quantifiers that
are independent of c, including (∃d/D).
Theorem 6.15. Any regular, modest IF tree is in FO.
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Proof. Suppose there is a ∀c such that ∀c ≺T ◦ ≺T (∃d/D) and c ∈ D. We
show how to push ∀c below (∃d/D) by quantifier swapping. First of all, notice
that there are no connectives between ◦ and (∃d/D); so, we can rearrange this
part of the tree in Hintikka normal form ([27], Theorem 5.45), as a sequence
of universals followed by a sequence of existentials. This does not alter the
dependence relations between quantifiers.
Secondly, one can push ∀c below the other universal quantifiers, until it is
immediately above the sequence of existential quantifiers.
If the sequence of existential quantifiers begins with quantifiers that are
independent of ∀c, swap them above ∀c.
Then, below ∀c and before ∃d, find the first pair of existential quantifiers
(∃u/U), (∃v/V ) such that: 1) (∃u/U) is immediately above (∃v/V ), 2) u de-
pends on c, and 3) v does not depend on c. Now, if v depended on u, then
∀c, (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) would form a signalling sequence, contradicting the hypoth-
esis that T is modest. So, v is independent of u; thus, we can swap (∃v/V )
above (∃u/U); then, for the same reason, we can push it above all the ex-
istential quantifiers that were between ∀c and (∃u/U); and finally, above ∀c.
Iterating this process, one can push above ∀c all the existential quantifiers that
are independent of c, including (∃d/D).
Theorem 6.16. Any regular, modest IF tree is in FO.
Proof. We want to show that given any modest tree T we can construct a
modest tree T ′ which is in prenex normal form and which is more complex than
T (that is, C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′)). If T ′ = QR, where Q is a quantifier prefix and R
is a quantifier-free tree, then we will clearly have C(T ′) ⊆ C(Q); and, Q being
primary, by Sevenster’s result (Prop. 6.10) C(Q) ⊆ FO (and Q will even be
equivalent to a first order prefix).
We know that the prenex transformations do not decrease the complexity
of a tree, but we face a problem: extraction of quantifiers does not preserve in
general the modesty of the tree. We will thus need to choose carefully the order
in which the extractions are performed.
So, let ◦ be a connective below which occur some quantifiers, and of max-
imum height among such connectives. We can assume, by Theorem 5.15, that
all purely existential slash sets are empty. Furthermore, by Lemma 6.14, we
can assume that no existential quantifier below ◦ is independent of universals
occurring below ◦ and above the existential itself (we call this normalization).
Immediately below ◦ occurs a quantifier (Qa/A), and we extract it above ◦
(after renaming a to a new variable a′, if necessary). We want to check that the
resulting tree is still modest. Let R be the subtree immediately below ◦ that
does not contain Qa. We use the strong extraction rule, transforming R into
R′ = R|a.
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...
◦
Qa/A
...
R
...
Qa′/A
◦
...
R′
1) Suppose Q = ∀.
1a) If the new tree is signalling, then this must be witnessed by ∀a itself
and by two existentials (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) occurring in R′ and such that a /∈ U ,
a ∈ V , u /∈ V . But, in that case it means that U is empty and that the slash
set of v contains another variable b (otherwise, the strong extraction rule would
have preserved the empty slash set); by our normalization assumptions, we can
assume b is universally quantified above ◦. But then, the quantifiers over b, u, v
prove that the old tree was signalling: contradiction.
1b) Suppose the new tree T ′ is (linear) Henkin. Then there are quantifiers
(∃u/U), (∃v/V ), occurring in R′, such that a /∈ U and a ∈ V , and a universal
quantifier ∀b, above (∃v/V ), such that b /∈ V . Since strong extraction was used,
a /∈ U implies that U = ∅; and a ∈ V , plus the normalization assumptions,
implies that there is a universal quantifier ∀c occurring above (∃v/V ) and such
that c ∈ V .
FIRST SUBCASE: (∃v/V ) ≺T ′ ∃u. Then by definition of Henkin pattern it
must be v ∈ U ; but this contradicts the above observation that U = ∅.
SECOND SUBCASE: ∃u ≺T ′ (∃v/V ). Then u ∈ V . In this case we find no
contradiction, but we show that the case could have been avoided with some
extra normalization work. ∀b cannot occur above ∃u: if it did, then ∀b, ∃u, ∃v/V
would be a signalling pattern already occurring in T : contradiction. The same
reasoning applies to ∀c. So, ∃u ≺ ∀b, ∀c ≺ (∃v/V ). But no connective occurs
between ∀b and (∃v/V ); this means that (by an argument similar to Lemma
6.14) ∀c could have been pushed below ∃v before the extraction rule was applied;
so that the present case would not have occurred.
1c) Suppose instead the new tree is generalized Henkin. Our normalization
excludes the possibility that the left subtree below ◦ contains an existential
quantifier independent of a; so, the new tree being generalized Henkin means
that R′ contains a quantifier (∃v/V ) depending on some superordinated ∀z but
not on a, and the left branch contains (∃u/U) such that u depends on a (but not
on z). However, since the strong extraction rule was used, a ∈ V implies that
V \ {a} 6= ∅; the normalization assumptions give us a quantifier ∀b occurring
above ◦, superordinated to v, such that v does not depend on b. Now there are
three cases.
a) u depends on b. In this case, the old tree was already generalized Henkin
(as witnessed by ∀b, ∃u, ∀z, ◦, ∃v): contradiction.
b) u does not depend on b, and there is a disjunction ∀b ≺ ∨  ◦. Then the
old tree was coordinated (as witnessed by ∀b, ∀z, ∀a,∨, ∃u, ∃v): a contradiction.
c) u does not depend on b, and there is no disjunction ∀b ≺ ∨  ◦. In this
case we find no contradiction, but we show that we could have performed some
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transformation before applying the extraction rule, so that this case c) would
not occur. There are no existentials depending on b and above (∃u/U) and
(∃v/V ) – otherwise the tree would be either signalling or Henkin. So, ∀b can
be pushed down by quantifier swapping and distribution, until it goes below
◦. Repeating this for all quantifiers that play the same role as ∀b, we obtain a
tree that does not fall in clause c) after the application of the extraction rule.
Finally, we can normalize the resulting tree.
1d) Now, suppose instead the new tree is coordinated, first kind. It means
that, in the new tree, ∀a plays either the role of ∀x or that of ∀y in the definition
of coordinated tree.
In the first case, it means that ◦ is a disjunction, and in the new tree there
are quantifiers ∀z, ∀x and, in R′, a quantifier (∃v/V ) such that v depends on
z but not on a; and in the other subtree below ◦ there is a quantifier (∃u/U)
such that u depends on x but not on a. Since the strong extraction rule was
used, a ∈ V implies that V \ {a} 6= ∅; the normalization assumptions give us
a quantifier ∀b occurring above ◦, superordinated to v, such that v does not
depend on b.
We check again the three cases a), b), c) as above; the case a) works as
before, case b) similarly (coordination of the old tree is certified by ∀b, ∀x, ∀z
instead of ∀b, ∀a, ∀z); finally, c) cannot happen.
In the second case (∀a playing the role of ∀x in the definition of coordinated
tree), there is an existential quantifier (∃v/V ) in R′ such that v depends on a.
Since the strong extraction rule was applied, it means that the quantifier over
v, in R′, is first-order; but we also require, for the tree to be coordinated, that
v is independent of some universally quantifier variable superordinated to it, so
that the slash set of ∃v is nonempty: a contradiction.
1e) Suppose T ′ is coordinated, second kind. Then, T ′ contains a coordinated
pattern ∀a, ∀y, ∀z,∨, (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) of the second kind. Suppose a plays the
role of a quantifier which is seen by one of the existentials (say ∃u depends on
a but not on y nor z) but not by the other. But since y, z ∈ V , the strong
extraction rule should have added a to the slash set of u: contradiction.
So, we must suppose instead that a ∈ U and a ∈ V (and: u sees y and not
z, v sees z and not y).
Furthermore, we can suppose that (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) occur in distinct paths of
the tree (if they occurred in the same path, then ∀y, ∀z, (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) would
have formed an Henkin pattern already in T: contradiction). So, there must be
a conjunction ∧ occurring below ∨, such that (∃u/U) occurs (say) in the left
conjunct and (∃v/V ) occurs in the right conjunct.
Now, since a ∈ U and the strong extraction rule has been applied, there must
be some other universally quantified variable cu in U ; similarly, there must be
some cv ∈ V . We consider separately the cases that cu is z (or, symmetrically,
cv is y), or both cu, cv are new variables that are not part of the coordinated
pattern.
FIRST SUBCASE: z ∈ U . Then ∀y, ∀z,∧, ∃u, ∃v was generalized Henkin in
T : contradiction. (The case “y ∈ V ” is analogous).
SECOND SUBCASE: cu ∈ U and cv ∈ V , with cu, cv 6= z, y. We can exclude
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that both ∀cu and ∀cv occur below ∧ (we could have pushed, for example, ∀cu
below (∃u/U) by a procedure similar to that used in Lemma 6.14).
Suppose then that, for example, ∀cu occurs above ∧. In case there is no
disjunction symbol between ∀cu and ∧, then ∀cu could have been pushed below ∧
by means of quantifier swapping11 and distribution, falling again in the previous
contradictory subcase. If instead there is a disjunction ∨ between ∀cu and ∧, we
observe that either a) cu ∈ V , and ∀cu, ∀y,∧, ∃u, ∃v form a generalized Henkin
pattern; or, b), cu /∈ V , and ∀cu, ∀y, ∀z,∨, ∃u, ∃v form a coordinated pattern.
In both cases we have a contradiction.
2) Suppose Q = ∃.
Then the new tree is not signalling (the existential quantifiers in R′ are either
first-order, in which case they cannot play the role of the rightmost quantifier
of a signalling pattern, or they have nonempty slash set, in which case a has
been added to their slash set in R′, and they cannot receive signals from ∃a).
Suppose the new tree is (linear) Henkin. Then there are quantifiers ∀x, ∀y,
(∃b/B) such that ∀x, (∃a/A), ∀y, (∃b/B) form a linear Henkin pattern in T ′.
But then the logical operators ∀x, (∃a/A), ∀y, (∃b/B′), ◦ (where B′ = B ∪ {a})
formed a generalized Henkin pattern in T : contradiction.
The tree cannot become generalized Henkin nor coordinated, because in the
new tree there is no new universal-existential dependence pair.
7 Trees of high complexity
Def 7.1. Let T, U be positive initial trees. We say that U extends T if there
is an injective function µ : T → U such that:
1) for every quantifier (Qv/V ) in T , µ((Qv/V )) = (Qv/V ′), and for every
connective c, µ(c) is an occurrence of the same connective
2) µ preserves the subordination ordering ≺T
3) if (Qv/V ) and (Qw/W ) occur in T , then the latter depends on the former if
and only if µ((Qw/W )) depends on µ((Qv/V )).
The clause 2) makes our definition stricter than the corresponding notion for
quantifier prefixes given by Sevenster. The correct generalization should allow
some form of swapping of independent quantifiers. However, we will not need
such subtleties.
Lemma 7.2. If a regular IF positive initial tree extends an NL-hard (resp. P,
NP-hard) positive initial tree, then it is NL-hard (resp. P, NP-hard) itself.
Proof. Suppose T is NL-hard (resp. P,NP-hard). If U extends T , then there
is a µ such that U can be obtained by adding, one by one, quantifiers and
11Could there be any existential quantifier (∃w/W ), between ∀cu and ∧, such that cu ∈W ?
Such an occurrence would make it impossible to push down the quantifier ∀cu. However, in
such case ∀cu,∃w,∀y, ∃u would have formed already a signalling or a Henkin pattern (depend-
ing on whether ∃u sees w or not).
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connectives to µ(T ), in some arbitrary order (and possibly adding the newly
quantified variables to subordinated quantifiers). We prove the theorem by
induction on one of these possible constructions; what we want to prove is that,
given any weak, sentential function f for T , and any structure M (suitable for
fˆ(T ), i.e., containing at least interpretations for the symbols in fˆ(T )), there
is another such completing function f ′ for U , and a structure R(M), so that
M |= fˆ(T ) iff R(M) |= fˆ ′(U). Thus, R is shown to be a reduction from the
problem of checking fˆ(T ) on the class of structures suitable for fˆ(T ) to the
problem of checking fˆ ′(U) on structures suitable for fˆ ′(U). We will then show
that the reduction is logspace.
Suppose Tn and Tn+1 differ only in that one maximal linear suborder AB of
Tn is replaced by A(Qv/V )B
′ in Tn+1 (either A or B may be empty); and that
B′ differs from B only for the addition of variable v to some slash sets. Denote
as B, resp. B′ the smallest subtree of Tn, resp. of Tn+1, which contains B, resp.
B′. Define a structure R(M) which has the same domain as M, and interprets
a constant c. For any path P of Tn, call P
′ the corresponding path of Pn+1.
For any weak, sentential completing function e of Tn, define g as the complet-
ing function which assigns, to each path P ′ of Tn+1, the formula (v = c∧ e(P ))
in case P ′ intersects B′ and Q = ∃; and, otherwise, just formula e(P ). Then,
one can easily prove, by induction on the synctactical tree of eˆ(B), that
M,X |= eˆ(B)
m
R(M), X |= (Qv/V )gˆ(B′)
for any suitable team X and for every completing function e of Tn. See [31],
Lemma 20, for a detailed proof of a similar claim. The idea is this: the fact
that U is regular implies that T does not contain occurrences of v; and since e is
sentential, also e(T ) does not contain v. If we were discussing first-order logic,
this would be enough to ensure that Qv is a dummy, eliminable, quantifier; in
IF logic this is not sufficient, because an existentially quantified v could be used
to signal to some subordinated quantifier (∃u/U) the value of some variable in
U . But the additional clause v = c makes it impossible to store values in v.
Thus, by substitution of equivalents (2.12 plus 2.11), g is the completing
function for Tn+1 that we were looking for.
Suppose instead that Tn+1 differs from Tn in that a certain path AB is
turned into a tree A([ ] ∧ B) (the ordering of the conjuncts is unimportant).
For any completing function e of Tn, we can define the completing function g
for Tn+1 as that function which differs from e only in that it assigns ∀x(x = x)
to the path we marked with a [ ]. Then it is clear that
M |= eˆ(Tn)
m
M |= gˆ(Tn+1).
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The case that Tn+1 differs from Tn in that a certain path AB is turned
into a path A([ ] ∨ B) can be treated analogously, using ∀x(x 6= x) instead of
∀x(x = x).
It remains to show that the reduction R is logspace. But since R(M) differs
fromM only in that it contains an interpretation for the constant c, this addition
can be performed using logarithmic work space (in order to make space for the
interpretation of c, and to write this interpretation in the freed space, one only
needs a fixed number of counters over the elements of the structure; the values
assumed by each counter can be stored in binary digits, occupying logarithmic
space.
Theorem 7.3. Any regular positive initial tree which is Henkin encodes an
NP-complete problem.
Proof. Any such tree T extends a regular Henkin quantifier prefix. It was shown
in [31], Theorem 22, that regular Henkin prefixes encode the NP-complete prob-
lem of 3-COLORABILITY. So, from Lemma 7.2 it follows that T is NP-hard.
Since IF sentences are in NP (Prop. 2.7), T is NP-complete.
Theorem 7.4. Any regular positive initial tree which is signalling encodes an
NP-complete problem.
Proof. Use Lemma 7.2 and Prop. 2.7 again, on the basis that regular signalling
quantifier prefixes codify the NP-complete problem EXACT COVER BY 3-
SETS ([31], Theorem 23)12.
8 Complexity of Generalized Henkin trees
The minimal examples of (nonlinear) generalized Henkin trees are of the follow-
ing forms:
∀x
◦
∃u
[ ]
∀y
(∃v/x)
[ ]
∀x
∀y
◦
(∃u/y)
[ ]
(∃v/x)
[ ]
where ◦ is either ∨ or ∧. We will call GH1(◦) the first type, and GH2(◦) the
second.
12We also have an unpublished and rather simple description of SAT by means of the
minimal signalling prefix. From [35], Prop. 3.9.4., one can also obtain a description of DOM-
INATING SET by means of the minimal signaling prefix.
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8.1 SAT by a minimal generalized Henkin sentence
Here we express the NP-complete problem SAT by means of an IF sentence
whose (positive initial) tree is generalized Henkin (specifically, GH2(∨)), but
not Henkin nor signaling nor coordinated.
SAT Problem: Given a proposition in conjunctive normal form, with exactly
two literals per clause, decide whether there is an assignment which satisfies the
proposition.
How we model the problem: each instance of it is a structure of signature
P 2, N2, C1, 0, 1 (0, 1 are constants denoting two distinct elements; C(y): “y is
a clause”; ¬C(y): “y is a propositional letter”; P (x, y) : “x occurs positively in
y”; N(x, y) : “x occurs negatively in y”); we allow only structures such that for
each clause y there are at least two prop.letters x such that P (x, y) ∨ N(x, y).
It is well known that, even with this restriction, the SAT problem stays NP-
complete.
For brevity, we shall write O(x, y), “x occurs in y”, as a shortening for
¬C(x) ∧ C(y) ∧ (P (x, y) ∨N(x, y)).
The sentence is:
ϕ : ∀x∀y((∃u/y)ψ1 ∨ (∃v/x)ψ2)
where
ψ1 : O(x, y) ∧ (P (x, y)→ u = 1) ∧ (N(x, y)→ u = 0)
and
ψ2 : O(v, y) ∧ (O(x, y)→ x 6= v).
Theorem 8.1. If M is a suitable structure, then M |= ϕ iff M is a “yes”
instance of SAT.
The idea behind this description is similar to that of Jarmo Kontinen’s The-
orem 4.3.3 from his PhD thesis (although, he deals with a very different kind
of descriptive complexity; and although his method seems to capture just the
2-SAT problem). See [22] or [23] for a comparison. Think of x as a proposi-
tional letter, u as the truth value which is assigned to x, y as a clause, v as a
propositional letter which corresponds to a literal of y which is made true by
the truth assignment. The left disjunct enforces u to be a truth assignment; the
y-uniformity of the function which picks u guarantees that the assignment is
correctly defined, i.e., a function of the propositional letters. The right disjunct
ensures that, for every clause yˆ, there is at least one literal in it (corresponding
to a prop.letter vˆ) which is made true by the assignment (because the pair (vˆ, yˆ)
is necessarily sent to the left disjunct).
Proof. 1) Suppose M is a “yes” instance. Then there is a truth assignment T
on propositional letters which makes the proposition
∧
{c ∈ M |c ∈ CM} true.
This means that to each clause c we can associate a propositional letter f(c)
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which either occurs positively in c and T (f(c)) = 1, or it occurs negated in c and
T (f(c)) = 0. Let R be {(f(c), c)|c ∈M}, and S =M2\R. Let Y = Teamxy(R)
and Z = Teamxy(S) be the corresponding teams of domain {x, y}. They form
a partition of {∅}[M/x,M/y]. Let Y ′ := Y [T/u]; clearly M,Y ′ |= ψ1. Instead,
define Z ′ = Z[f/v]. Any triple (x, y, v) ∈ Z ′ either is such that x occurs not in
the clause y, or, if it does, x is not f(y) (because the pair (f(y), y) is not in Z).
So, Z ′ satisfies ψ2.
2) SupposeM is a “no” instance. Let Y, Z be any partition of {∅}[M/x,M/y];
let T be a y-uniform function Y →M ; let f be an x-uniform function Z →M .
Define Y ′, Z ′ from X,Y, T, f as was done above. Since T cannot be a satis-
fying assignment, there must be a clause yˆ such that, for any propositional
letter x, the triple (x, yˆ, u) falsifies either P (x, y) → u = 1 or N(x, y) → u = 0
or O(x, y). So, if M,Y ′ |= ψ1, then for every x /∈ CM , (x, yˆ, u) /∈ Y ′; so,
(x, yˆ) /∈ Y ; so, (x, yˆ) ∈ Z. But then, if (x, yˆ, v) ∈ Z ′, by x-uniformity of f , then
also (x′, yˆ, v) ∈ Z ′ for any propositional letter x′. So, v must be equal to some
such x′. Thus, M,Z ′ 6|= O(x, y)→ x 6= v: contradiction.
Corollary 8.2. The minimal generalized Henkin tree
∀x
∀y
∨
(∃u/y)
[ ]
(∃v/x)
[ ]
and any positive initial tree extending it are NP-complete.
It is perhaps of some interest that the SAT-describing sentence above can
be rewritten as an Henkin prefix sentence
(
∀x ∃u
∀y ∃v
)
(ψ1 ∨ ψ2).
This is an example of an H12 sentence which cannot be reduced in any obvious
way to a F12 sentence, since the variables u and v describe here two very different
functions (see e.g. [24] for the definition of the function quantifier F12 and related
discussions).
8.2 Disjunction-free Generalized Henkin trees
The minimal trees GH1(◦) and GH2(∧) can be easily shown to be first-order (use
quantifier distribution for GH1(∧) and GH2(∧); use the strong extraction rule
in the longest path of GH1(∨)). This tells us nothing about their extensions.
We might conjecture that, if one tree falls in one of these classes but not in any
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other class that we have isolated13, then it is in FO. We fall short of proving
such results in full generality; for example, in the case of extensions of GH1(∧)
and GH2(∧) we prove this to hold only under the additional assumption that
the tree in question does not contain disjunctions.
Theorem 8.3. 1) If a tree T is in GH1(∧) but it does not contain disjunctions,
and is not Henkin, nor signalling, then it has first-order complexity.
2) If a tree T is in GH2(∧) but it does not contain disjunctions, and is not in
GH1(∧), Henkin, nor signalling, then it has first-order complexity.
Proof. 1) Suppose T satisfies the hypotheses; then, it contains at least one
pattern
...
∀x
...
∧
...
(∃u/U)
...
...
∀y
...
(∃v/V )
...
where x /∈ U, y /∈ V, x ∈ V , witnessing that T is GH1(∧).
Notice:
1. There are, by hypothesis, no disjunctions between ∀x and (∃v/V ).
2. Every existential quantifier (∃w/W ) between ∀x and (∃v/V ) is independent
of ∀x (otherwise either ∀x, ∃w, ∀y, ∀v form a Henkin pattern, or ∀x, ∃w, ∀v form
a signalling pattern). Consequently, ∀x can be pushed below any such quantifier
by the quantifier swapping rule.
3. ∀x can be pushed below any other universal quantifier by quantifier swap-
ping.
4. ∀x can be pushed below any conjunction by means of quantifier distribution.
None of these tranformations generates new dependence patterns, nor disjunc-
tion symbols; so, applying them preserves the hypotheses of the theorem. Using
these transformations, one can push ∀x below ∧, so that there is one less witness
of the GH1(∨) pattern.
Iterating the process, one can remove all witnesses of the GH1(∨) pattern,
until the resulting tree is modest (and thus of first-order complexity, Theorem
6.16).
2) Analogous.
13Such a tree will be called an extension∗ of GH1(∧), resp. of GH2(∧), GH1(∨). We use
this terminology in the summary table at the end of the paper.
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8.3 Conjunction-free GH1 trees
Here we prove that extensions∗ of GH1(∨) are in FO, under the additional
assumption that they do not contain conjunction symbols.
Theorem 8.4. Suppose an IF positive initial tree has no conjunctions, and it
is not GH2, coordinated, Henkin nor signalling. Then it can be reduced to a
first-order tree, and is thus in the FO complexity class.
Proof. Suppose the tree is not modest; then it is GH1(∨), and so it has the
following form:
...
∀x
...
∨1
...
∨n
...
(∃u/U)
...
...
∀y
...
(∃v/V )
...
where ∀x,∨n, ∃u, ∀y, ∃v form a GH1(∨) pattern (i.e., x /∈ U, y /∈ V, x ∈ V ),
(*) ∨n has maximal depth among disjunctions that are part of a GH1(∨) pattern,
and (**) (∃v/V ) has minimal depth among existential quantifiers that form a
GH1(∨) pattern together with ∀x,∨n, ∃u, ∀y; and ∨1, . . . ,∨n is an exhaustive
list of all disjunctions occurring between ∀x and ∨n.
We can also assume, without loss of generality, that:
1. All universal quantifiers have empty slash sets.
2. All nonempty slash sets contain at least one universally quantified variable.
Our final aim is to push the quantifiers ∀y and ∃v above ∀x, so that x can be
removed from the slash set of ∃v. The purpose is to obtain a new tree which still
satisfies the hypotheses (it has no conjunctions, and it is not GH2, coordinated,
Henkin nor signalling) of the theorem, but has one less witness of the GH1(∨)
pattern (we must also check that new witnesses of GH1(∨) are not generated
in the process). So, one can repeat the procedure until there are no more such
witnesses: the resulting tree is modest, and thus we already know (Theorem
6.16) it is reducible to a first-order tree.
Notice that it might be necessary to push above also some other quantifiers
(Qr/R), occurring between ∀y and (∃v/V ), such that r /∈ V (they cannot be
pushed below ∃v); and (***) if (Qr/R) is existential, then x /∈ R, otherwise
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∀x, ∃r, ∃v would form a signalling pattern. It is also safe to assume that (****)
for every such quantifier (Qr/R), r /∈ V (otherwise (Qr/R) might be pushed
below (∃v/V )).
We divide this whole process into four phases, which will constitute four
parts of the proof.
Phase 1: Push ∀y and ∃v (and the quantifiers in between) upwards, until they
are immediately below ∨n.
Phase 2: push the quantifiers above ∨n
Phase 3: push the quantifiers above ∨1
Phase 4: push the quantifiers above ∀x.
In each phase, we check that the transformation performed cannot generate
any new higher-order or GH1(∨) patterns. We will proceed by contradiction:
“suppose that the transformed tree T ′ has a certain pattern. Then, already the
untrasformed tree T had some forbidden pattern...”
PHASE 1: We must show how to push the quantifiers ∀y and (∃v/V ) (together
with those in between) above disjunctions. We always use the weak extraction
rule: this prevents the formation of new signalling patterns. We also always
assume w.l.o.g. that the quantifiers we extract are in the right conjunct. So,
suppose that after pushing the quantifiers in question above some disjunction
∨, the new tree is:
• Henkin: then there is, in the left subformula, an ex. quantifier (∃w/W )
which depends on some ∀z, and quantifiers ∀yˆ, (∃vˆ/Vˆ ), occurring between
∀y and ∃v14, such that w does not depend on ∀yˆ nor ∃vˆ, and vˆ does not
depend on z nor w.
Suppose x ∈W . Then ∀x,∨n, ∀yˆ, ∀z, ∃w, ∃vˆ already formed a coordinated
pattern in T : contradiction.
Suppose instead x /∈ W . Then ∀x,∨, ∃w, ∀yˆ, ∃vˆ already formed a GH1(∨)
pattern in T . But ∨ has greater depth than ∨n, contradicting the assump-
tion (**).
• GH2, coordinated: then there is some existential quantifier (∃w/W ) (be-
low (∃v/V ), by (***)), and ∀yˆ, (∃vˆ/Vˆ ) as above, such that yˆ, vˆ ∈W , and
a quantifier ∀z on which w depends. Suppose first that (∃w/W ) is in
the right disjunct: then either ∀yˆ, ∃vˆ, ∃w already formed a signalling pat-
tern, or they formed a Henkin pattern together with some other universal
quantifier ∀z: contradiction. Suppose instead that (∃w/W ) is in the left
disjunct; then there are two possibilities: 1) x /∈W . Then ∀x, ∃w,∨, ∀yˆ, ∃vˆ
already formed a GH1(∨) with ∨ of greater depth than ∨n: contradiction.
2) x ∈ W . Then ∀x,∨, ∀z, ∃w, ∀yˆ, ∃vˆ already formed a coordinated tree:
contradiction.
• GH1(∨): There are two possibilities.
14Thus, ∀yˆ,∃vˆ might be ∀y, ∃v, or some other quantifiers occurring between ∀y and ∃v. We
follow the same naming convention in the rest of the proof.
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Case 1: There is a quantifier (∃w/W ) in the left subformula, and ∀yˆ as
above, such that yˆ /∈ W , and quantifiers ∀z and (∃s/S), occurring below
(∃v/V ), such that s sees z but not yˆ. Now notice that, if yˆ /∈ V , then
∀yˆ, ∃v, ∃s would have already formed a signalling pattern, or ∀yˆ, ∃v, ∀z, ∃s
a Henkin pattern: contradiction. So we can suppose that yˆ ∈ V . But this
contradicts (****).
Case 2: There are quantifiers ∀z, (∃w/W ) in the left subformula, and ∀yˆ
as above, such that z /∈ W but yˆ ∈ W , and a quantifier (∃s/S) occurring
below (∃v/V ) such that yˆ /∈ S. Notice that it must also be x ∈ W ,
otherwise ∀x,∨, ∃w, ∀y, ∃v would have formed a GH1(∨) pattern with ∨
of greater depth than ∨n (violating (**)). And it must also be the case that
x ∈ S, otherwise ∀x,∨, ∃s, ∀z, ∃w would have formed a GH1(∨) pattern
with ∨ of greater depth than ∨n.
But then, ∀x,∨, ∀z, ∃w, ∀yˆ, ∃s already formed a coordinated pattern: con-
tradiction.
PHASE 2: First of all, we prove that U = ∅. Suppose it is nonempty:
then (by 2.) there is some quantifier ∀z such that z ∈ U . Suppose first that
z /∈ V : then ∀x, ∀z,∨n, ∃u, ∃v form a GH2 pattern, a contradiction. If instead
z ∈ V , we have that ∀x, ∀z, ∀y,∨n, ∃u, ∃v form a coordinated pattern: again, a
contradiction.
Notice, then, that the same can be proved of any existential quantifier oc-
curring in the left disjunct and dependent on ∀x. We call # this observation.
Consequently, if we raise quantifiers from the right disjunct using the strong
quantifier extraction rule, no Henkin patterns can be generated. Suppose instead
that some other pattern is generated:
• Signalling: then the left disjunction contains an existential quantifier
(∃w/∅) and another quantifier (∃s/S) occurring below it, with S 6= ∅.
But then, by our assumption 2., S must contain some universally quanti-
fied variable t. Thus ∀t, ∃w, ∃s formed a signalling pattern already before
the transformation: a contradiction.
• Coordinated: then there is an (∃w/W ) in the left disjunct which depends
on some universal quantifier ∀s and is independent of some other quantifier
(so that, after the strong extraction, also y is in the slash set of ∃w); and
some ∀yˆ, (∃vˆ/Vˆ ), occurring between ∀y and ∃v, such that s, x ∈ Vˆ and
yˆ ∈W . But the observation # above implies that ∃w is independent of ∀x.
Then, ∀x,∨n, ∀s, ∀yˆ, ∃w, ∃vˆ formed a coordinated pattern: contradiction.
• GH2: Case 1: there was some existential quantifier (∃w/W ), occurring
below (∃v/V ), and a ∀yˆ between ∀y and ∃v, such that yˆ ∈ W . But then
∀x, ∃v, ∃w would have formed a signalling pattern: contradiction.
Case 2: there was some existential quantifier (∃w/W ) occurring in the
left disjunct, which depended on some universal ∀z occurring above ∨n,
and such that W is nonempty (so that, after the application of strong
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extraction, y is inserted in the slash set of w). But W 6= ∅ implies, by
observation #, that x ∈W . But then ∀x, ∀z,∨n, ∃w, ∀y, ∃v already formed
a coordinated pattern: contradiction.
• GH1(∨): The proof is identical to the GH2 case (except for the phrase
“∀z occurring above ∨n”).
PHASE 3: Just observe that # can be proved for each of the ∨i. Then, all
cases can be treated as in phase 2.
PHASE 4: use quantifier swapping until ∃v is above ∀x, and x does not
occur anymore in its slash set.
We attempted in vain to prove a similar result without the assumption that
the tree does not contain conjunctions. Adapting the above proof seems to fail
because there may occur patterns that are similar to coordinated ones, but with
a ∧ instead of an ∨:
∀x
∧
∀y
(∃v/x)
∀y
(∃w/x)
So, we might suspect that some GH1(∨) tree which also contains this pattern
(and falls not in any other relevant category) could be able to express something
beyond first-order logic.
9 Coordinated trees of the first kind
The minimal examples of coordinated trees of the first kind can have the fol-
lowing forms:
∀x
∨
∀y
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x)
[ ]
∀x
∀y
∨
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
∀x
∀y
∀z
∨
(∃u/x, z)
[ ]
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
We call these trees (and the corresponding fragments of IF logic) C1, C2,
and C3, from left to right. It is apparent that C(C1)⊆ C(C2) ⊆ C(C3).
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9.1 SAT by coordinated trees
First: observe that the coordinated tree C3 is an extension of the generalized
Henkin tree GH2(∨). So, by the Extension Lemma, it permits defining the SAT
problem. So, all trees extending C3 are NP-complete (and we can exclude them
from our classification, since they are a special case of GH2(∨) trees).
Secondly: we give a different (but similar in spirit) description of SAT by means
of the coordinated tree C2. This will prove that all trees extending C2 are NP-
complete. We use the same notations and conventions as in the previous section,
with the following exception: now P (x, y) is interpreted as “y is a prop. letter
occurring positively in the clause x”, and not viceversa; similarly for the rela-
tions N and O. O(x, y) is an abbreviation for C(x)∧¬C(y)∧(P (x, y)∨N(x, y)).
The SAT-defining sentence is:
θ : ∀x∀y((∃u/x)χ1 ∨ ∀z(∃v/xy)χ2)
where
χ1 : O(x, y) ∧ [(P (x, y)→ u = 1) ∧ (N(x, y)→ u = 0)]
and
χ2 : (z = x ∧O(x, y))→ (v 6= y ∧O(x, v)).
Theorem 9.1. If M is a suitable structure, then M |= θ iff M encodes a “yes”
instance of SAT.
Proof. 1) Suppose M encodes a “yes” instance of SAT. Then there is an as-
signment T of truth values to the propositional variables which makes the con-
junction of clauses true. This means that to each clause a we can associate
a proposition b = g(a) (we functionally choose one) such that either b occurs
positively in a, and T (b) = 1, or b occurs negatively in a, and T (b) = 0. We say
that such pairs are in a relation R(a, b). Now define Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[MM/xy] as:
Y := {{(x, a), (y, b)}|(a, b) ∈ R}, Z := {∅}[MM/xy] \ Y . Define the function
F : Y → M , by F (s) := T (s(y)) whenever s(y) is a propositional letter, and
arbitrarily otherwise. Then, by the comments on T above, M,Y [F/u] |= χ1.
Suppose s ∈ Z[MG/zv] satisfies s(z) = s(x). Then g(s(z)) = g(s(x)). De-
fine the function G : Z[M/z]→M as G(s) := g(s(z)). Then, if s ∈ Z[MG/zv],
s(y) 6= s(v), because s(v) = g(s(x)), and the pair ((x, s(x)), (v, g(s(x)))) is in Y ,
so not in Z. Furthermore, by the definition of g, (s(x), s(v)) = (s(x), g(s(x)) ∈
R, which implies (s(x), s(v)) ∈ OM . So M,Z[MG/zv] |= χ2.
2) Suppose M encodes a “no” instance of SAT. Fix an assignment T to
the propositional letters. Since the propositional formula encoded by M is not
satisfiable, it must contain a clause aˆ such that, for each propositional letter b,
one of the following holds: *) b occurs not in aˆ, or **) b occurs positively in aˆ
and T (b) = 0, or ***) b occurs negatively in aˆ and T (b) = 1. Call B the set of
bs that satisfy either ** or ***; it is nonempty, by the restriction we made on
structures (that each clause contain at least one literal).
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Let Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[MM/x, y] s.t. Y ∪ Z = {∅}[MM/x, y]. Define F from T as
above. Suppose that for some b, the assignment {(x, aˆ), (y, b)} is in Y . Then
M,Y 6|= χ1.
Suppose instead that for all b, {(x, aˆ), (y, b)} /∈ Y , which implies {(x, aˆ), (y, b)} ∈
Z. Let G : Z[M/z]→M be an {x, y}-uniform function. Then Z[MG/zv] con-
tains, for each b ∈ B, at least one assignment tb such that tb(z) = tb(x) = aˆ and
tb(y) = b.
If M,Z[MG/zv] |= χ2, then, for any b ∈ B , we have tb(v) 6= tb(y) and
(tb(x), tb(v)) ∈ OM . Fix a bˆ ∈ B. By y-uniformity of G, b = tb(y) 6= tbˆ(v) for
any b ∈ B; therefore, tb′(v) /∈ B, a contradiction. So, M,Z[MG/zv] 6|= χ. Thus,
our choice of X,Y, F,G does not witness M |= θ. Our choice of X,Y, F,G was
arbitrary, except for the fact that F was induced by some assignment T . In
case F is not obtained this way, it means that F (s) 6= 0, 1 for some s ∈ Y such
that s(y) is a prop. letter. But this is impossible: the assignment s(F/u) does
not satisfy χ1. So, our arguments holds for any choice of X,Y, F,G: we may
conclude that M 6|= θ.
2, alternative proof) Suppose M |= θ. Then there are Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[MM/xy],
a x-uniform function F : Y [M/y] → M and a xy-uniform G : Z[M/z] → M
such that Y ∪ Z = {∅}[MM/xy], M,Y [MF/yu] |= χ1 and M,Z[MG/zv] |=
χ2. Suppose for sake of contradiction that, for some clause aˆ ∈ CM , s ∈ Y
implies s(x) 6= aˆ. By our assumption on structures, that in each clause at
least one literal occurs, there must be an s ∈ Z such that b := s(y) occurs
in aˆ. Pick s′ ∈ Z[MG/zv] such that s′(x) = aˆ, s′(y) = b and s′(z) = s′(x).
Since M,Z[MG/zv] |= χ2, we have s′(v) 6= s(y) and (s′(v), s(x)) ∈ OM . By
xy-uniformity of G, s(v) = G(s↾{x,y,z}) is different from any s
′′(y) such that
s′′ ∈ Z. Then, the assignment {(x, aˆ), (y, s(v))} must be in Y , contradicting
our hypothesis.
So, for each clause a, there is a propositional letter g(a) occurring in a
such that sa = {(x, a), (y, g(a))} ∈ Y . Define T (g(a)) := F (sa), and extend it
arbitrarily to a propositional assignment over propositional letters that are not
of the form g(a). Since M,Y [MF/yu] |= χ1 and Y contains sa for each clause
a, T is an assignment that satisfies the instance of SAT which is encoded by M .
In this proof we used the restriction that each clause contain at least one
literal; eliminating such restriction on the class of structures would require the
usage of an extra existential quantifier (independent of x) in each disjunct; the
resulting tree would be an extension of the one considered, and (because of the
right disjunct) either signalling or a Henkin tree. The result above, in any case
proves that the model checking problem for the tree C2 is (modulo Cobham’s
thesis) unfeasible on all structures: indeed, the sentence above defines the NP-
complete problem “M is in SAT or M is not the encoding of an instance of SAT”.
So:
Corollary 9.2. The coordinated tree C2 (and any tree extending it) is NP-
complete.
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9.2 NP-completeness of C1
We show here that the NP-complete problem SET SPLITTING (see e.g. [12])
is definable by means of the coordinated tree C1. This result was obtained in
collaboration with Lauri Hella.
Input: a set A, a family B ⊆ ℘(A) s.t., for every B ∈ B, card(b) ≥ 2.
Measure: card(A ∪ B).
Problem: Is there a partition {U, V } of A such that, for each B ∈ B, B ∩U 6= ∅
and B ∩ V 6= ∅?
We encode input instances as structures of domain A ∪ B (with B ⊆ ℘(A)
such that each of its element has at least cardinality 2) which interprets in the
obvious way unary predicates A and B, and a binary set membership” relation
R∈ (with the restriction that, if (a,B) ∈ R∈, then a ∈ A, B ∈ B and a ∈ B).
The requirement that the sets in B have at least cardinality 2 is our addition
to the original problem; it obviously does not decrease its complexity, and it
makes the problem easier to define in our fragment of IF logic.
The defining sentence is:
η : ∀x(∀y(∃u/{x})ǫ1 ∨ ∀z(∃v/{x})ǫ2)
where
ǫ1 : (A(x) ∧ B(y))→ (u 6= x ∧R∈(u, y))
and
ǫ2 : (A(x) ∧ B(z))→ (v 6= x ∧R∈(v, z))
Theorem 9.3. For every suitable structure M , M |= η iff M encodes a “yes”
instance of SET SPLITTING.
Proof. ⇐) Let M be a “yes” instance of SET SPLITTING. Let {U, V } be a
partition of A which satisfies the requirement of the problem: for every B ∈ B,
B∩U 6= ∅ and B∩V 6= ∅. For eachB ∈ B, choose a uB ∈ B∩V and a vB ∈ B∩U .
Define teams Y := {s ∈ {∅}[M/x]|s(x) ∈ U} and Z := {∅}[M/x] \Y ; they form
a partition of {∅}[M/x]. Let F : Y [M/y] → M be defined as F (s) := uB if
s(y) = B ∈ B, and as an arbitrary function of y otherwise. LetG : Z[M/z]→M
be defined as G(s) := vB if s(z) = B ∈ B, and arbitrarily otherwise. Since the
uBs are in V , they are not in U , and so every s ∈ Y [MF/yu] is such that, if
s(y) ∈ B, then s(u) = F (s↾{x,y}) = uB 6= s(x) ∈ U . So, M,Y [MF/yu] |= ǫ1. A
symmetrical argument shows that M,Z[MG/zv] |= ǫ2.
⇒) Suppose M |= η. Then there are Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[M/x] such that Y ∪ Z =
{∅}[M/x], and x-uniform functions F : Y [M/y] → M and G : Z[M/z] → M ,
such thatM,Y [MF/yu] |= ǫ1 andM,Z[MG/zv] |= ǫ2. Define U as {a ∈ A|∃s ∈
Y (s(x) = a)}, and V := A \ U . Since U ∪ V = A, at least one out of U and V
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is nonempty. We suppose w.l.o.g. that U be nonempty, which implies that Y is
nonempty.
Let B ∈ B. Let sB ∈M,Y [MF/yu] be an assignment such that sB(y) = B
and sB(x) ∈ A (there is at least one such sB, because of the nonemptyness
of Y and the fact that y is universally quantified). The fact that M, sB |= ǫ1
implies that sB(u) ∈ sB(y) = B and sB(u) 6= sB(x); since sB(u) = F (s↾{x,y}),
the x-uniformity of F implies that sB(u) 6= s(x) for any s ∈ Y [MF/yu], that
is, sB(u) 6= a for any a ∈ U . So sB(u) ∈ B ∩ V .
This furthermore implies that V 6= ∅. So, by a symmetric argument one can
prove the existence of one element in B ∩ U .
Corollary 9.4. The coordinated tree C1, as all trees extending it, is NP-
complete.
This concludes the classification of coordinated trees up to reduction closure.
However, since we do not known whether coordinated trees capture NP or any
smaller complexity class, it might be of interest that we found a description of
an L-complete problem, 2-COLORABILITY, by means of the minimal C1 tree.
This problem is known not to be in FO.
The sentence, in the language of graphs, is:
ξ : ∀x(∀y(∃u/{x})ξ1 ∨ ∀z(∃v/{x, y})ξ2)
where
ξ1 : E(x, y)→ (u = y ∧ u 6= x)
and
ξ2 : E(x, z)→ (v = z ∧ v 6= x).
Theorem 9.5. A graph structure M satisfies ξ if and only if it encodes a “yes”
instance of 2-COLORABILITY.
Proof. 1) Suppose M is a yes” instance of 2-COLORABILITY. Then, it can
be partitioned into two subsets A,B such that c ∈ A plus (c, d) ∈ EM implies
d ∈ B, and viceversa.
Define Y := {s ∈ {∅}[M/x]|s(x) ∈ A} and Z = {∅}[M/x] \ Y . Define
F : Y [M/y]→M , F (s) := s(y), and G : Z[M/z]→M , G(s) := s(z).
Notice that, if s ∈ Y , then s(x) ∈ A; and if (s(x), s(y)) ∈ EM , then s(y) ∈ B;
so, since A and B are disjoint, s(y) 6= s(x). Furthermore, s(u) = s(y) by the
definition of F . Thus, M,Y [MF/yu] |= ξ1. The proof that M,Z[MG/zv] |= ξ2
is completely anologous.
2) Suppose M |= ξ. Then there are Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[M/x], a x-uniform function
F : Y [M/y] → M and a x-uniform G : Z[M/z] → M such that Y ∪ Z =
{∅}[M/x], M,Y [MF/yu] |= ξ1 and M,Z[MG/zv] |= ξ2. By downward closure,
we can assume that Y ∩ Z = ∅. Let A := {a ∈ M |(x, a) ∈ Y }, and B =
M \ A. Now suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that a ∈ A, (a, c) ∈ EM
and c ∈ A. There is an s ∈ Y [MF/yu] such that s(x) = a and s(y) = c. Since
M,Y [MF/yu] |= ξ1 and M, s |= E(x, y), we have s(u) = s(y) and s(u) 6= s(x).
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Since s(u) = F (s↾{x,y}) and F is x-uniform, we have s(u) 6= s
′(x) for any
s′ ∈ Y [MF/yu]. But s(u) = s(y); so, s(y) is different from any s′′(x) such that
s′′ ∈ Y . Thus c = s(y) ∈ B: a contradiction.
Similarly one proves that b ∈ B, (b, c) ∈ EM implies c ∈ A.
10 Coordinated trees, second kind
A coordinated tree is of the second kind if contains some logical operators
∀x, ∀y, ∀z,∨, (∃u/U), (∃v/V ) that form a coordinated pattern, and such that
(∃v/V ), (∃v/V ) occur in the same disjunct below ∨. If we want to avoid the
trivial (linear Henkin) case that (∃v/V ), (∃v/V ) are in the same path of the tree,
we must suppose that below ∨ there is a conjunction ∧ such that (∃u/U) occurs
(say) in the left conjunct, and (∃v/V ) occurs in the right conjunct. Taking into
account all the different positions in which ∀y, ∀z, and ignoring permutations
of quantifiers of the same kind, we can isolate six minimal coordinated trees of
the second kind:
∀x
∨
[ ] ∧
∀y
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x)
[ ]
∀x
∨
[ ] ∀y
∧
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
∀x
∨
[ ] ∀y
∀z
∧
(∃u/x, z)
[ ]
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
∀x
∀y
∨
[ ] ∧
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
∀x
∀y
∨
[ ] ∀z
∧
(∃u/x, z)
[ ]
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
∀x
∀y
∀z
∨
[ ] ∧
(∃u/x, z)
[ ]
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
From left to right, we call these trees C1’, C2’, C3’, C4’, C5’, C6’. Before the
reader starts worrying because of this explosion of cases, we point out that only
the C1’ case is genuinely new, while C2’, C3’, C4’, C5’, C6’ are extensions of
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either tree GH1(∧) or GH2(∧); in a certain sense, they fall in cases that we had
already left open before. Notice, furthermore, that C(C1’) ⊆ C(C2’) ⊆ C(C3’)
⊆ C(C5’) ⊆ C(C6’) and C(C1’) ⊆ C(C2’) ⊆ C(C4’) ⊆ C(C5’) ⊆ C(C6’).
We show that the trees C1’, C2’, C3’ are first-order (but we leave as an open
problem the study of their extensions).
Theorem 10.1. The C1’, C2’ and C3’ trees are in FO.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove it for C3’. By quantifier distribution and quantifier
swapping, the tree C3’ can be transformed into
∀x
∨
[ ] ∧
∀y
(∃u/x)
∀z
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x)
∀y
[ ]
(which is what one obtains attaching two extra quantifiers ∀z, ∀y below the
rightmost paths of the coordinated tree C1’.) Let
ϕ : ∀x(ψ1(x) ∨ (∀y(∃u/{x})∀zψ2(x, y, u, z) ∧ ∀z(∃v/{x})∀yψ3(x, z, v, y)))
be a generic IF sentence beginning with it; we want to prove it to be equivalent
to
ϕ′ : ∀x(ψ1(x) ∨ (∀y(∃u/{x})(∃v/{x, u})∀z(ψ2(x, y, u, z) ∧ ψ3(x, y, v, z))).
Then by quantifier extraction one obtains
∀x∀y(∃u/{x})(∃v/{x, u})∀z(ψ1(x) ∨ (ψ2(x, y, u, z) ∧ ψ3(x, y, v, z)))
and by quantifier swapping
∀y∃u(∃v/{u})∀x∀z(ψ1(x) ∨ (ψ2(x, y, u, z) ∧ ψ3(x, y, v, z))).
Since the slash set of v contains only an existentially quantified variable, u, it
can be made empty, thus obtaining a first-order sentence.
But let us show the equivalence of ϕ and ϕ′. 1) Suppose M,X |= ϕ. Then
there are Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[M/x] such that Y, Z ⊆ {∅}[M/x], and x-uniform func-
tions F : Z[M/y] → M and G : Z[M/z] → M , such that M,Y |= ψ1(x),
M,Z[MFM/yuz] |= ψ2(x, y, u, z) and M,Z[MGM/zvy] |= ψ3(x, z, v, y).
Then, define G′ : Z[MF/yu]→M as G′(s) := G(s↾dom(s)\{y,u}(s(y)/z)). It
should be clear that M,Z[MFG′M/yuvz] |= ψ2(x, y, u, z) ∧ ψ3(x, y, v, z), and
that G′ is {x, u}-uniform.
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2) Suppose M,X |= ϕ′, and thus we have Y, Z, F,G′ as above. For any
s ∈ Z[M/z], let s′ ∈ Z[M/y] be s−z(s(z)/y); and let s′′ ∈ Z[MF/yu] be
s′(F (s′)/u). Then one can define G : Z[M/z] → M as G(s) := G′(s′′). Then
it is immediate to verify that M,Z[MGM/zvy] |= ψ3(x, y, u, z), and that G is
x-uniform.
With a different argument, we prove that the tree C6’ (and thus C5’, C4’)
is in FO (the key idea of the proof is due to Lauri Hella). Again, the result tells
us nothing about extensions of these trees.
Theorem 10.2. The trees C4’, C5’, C6’ are in FO.
Proof. We prove that a sentence ϕ which begins with tree C6’
∀x
∀y
∀z
∨
ψ1(x, y, z) ∧
(∃u/x, z)
ψ2(x, y, z, u)
(∃v/x, y)
ψ3(x, y, z, v)
is equivalent to a sentence ϕ′ of the form
∀x
∀y
∧
(∃u/x, z)
∀x
∨
ψ1(x, y, z) ψ2(x, y, z, u)
(∃v/x, y)
∀x
∨
ψ1(x, y, z) ψ3(x, y, z, v)
Notice that the resulting formula can also be obtained as completion of the
positive initial tree
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∀x
∀y
∧
(∃u/x, z)
∀x
[ ]
(∃v/x, y)
∀x
[ ]
which is a disjunction-free extension∗ of the GH2(∧) tree, and thus in FO,
by Theorem 8.3. So, ϕ itself is equivalent to a first-order sentence.
So, now we have to prove the above equivalence.
=⇒) M |= ϕ iff there are teams X1, X2 ⊆ {∅}[MMM/xyz] such that X1 ∪
X2 = {∅}[MMM/xyz], a {x, z}-uniform function F : X1 → M , and a {x, y}-
uniform function G : X2 → M , such that M,X1 |= ψ1(x, y, z), M,X2[F/u] |=
ψ2(x, y, z, u), and M,X2[G/v] |= ψ3(x, y, z, v).
Now fix an a ∈ M , and define functions F ′, G′ : {∅}[MM/yz] → M as
F ′(s) := F (s(a/x)) and G′(s) = G(s(a/x)). Obviously F ′ is z-uniform and G′
is y-uniform.
Define teams X ′1 := {s ∈ {∅}[MMF
′M/yzux]|M, s |= ψ1(x, y, z)} and
X ′2 := {∅}[MMF
′M/yzux] \ X ′1. We have to verify that, then, M,X
′
2 |=
ψ2(x, y, z, u). Suppose this is not the case, that is, there is an assignment
s ∈ X ′2 such that M, s 6|= ψ2(x, y, z, u). Then we also have that M, {s−u} 6|=
(∃u/{x, z})ψ2(x, y, z, u) (where s−u is the assignment s restricted to dom(s) \
{u}). This implies that s−u ∈ X1; so, that s ∈ X ′1; this contradicts the initial
assumption that s ∈ X ′2.
One can then analogously define X ′3 := {s ∈ {∅}[MMG
′M/yzvx]|M, s |=
ψ1(x, y, z)} and X ′4 := {∅}[MMG
′M/yzvx] \ X ′3, and prove that M,X
′
4 |=
ψ3(x, y, z, v).
⇐=) M |= ϕ′ iff there are functions F ′, G′ : {∅}[MM/yz] → M (F ′ z-
uniform, and G′ y-uniform) such that M, {∅}[MMF ′M/yzux] |= ψ1(x, y, z) ∨
ψ2(x, y, z, u), and M, {∅}[MMG′M/yzvx] |= ψ1(x, y, z) ∨ ψ3(x, y, z, v). Call-
ing X ′1 := {s ∈ {∅}[MMF
′M/yzux]|M, s |= ψ1(x, y, z)} and X
′
1 := {s ∈
{∅}[MMG′M/yzvx]|M, s |= ψ1(x, y, z)}, the last two statements above are
equivalent to the existence of a team X ′2 ⊆ {∅}[MMF
′M/yzux] such that X1 ∪
X ′2 = {∅}[MMF
′M/yzux] and M,X ′2 |= ψ2, and, respectively, to the existence
of a team X ′3 ⊆ {∅}[MMG
′M/yzvx] such that X1 ∪X ′3 = {∅}[MMG
′M/yzvx]
and M,X ′3 |= ψ3.
Let X1 := {s ∈ {∅}[MMM/xyz]|M, s |= ψ1(x, y, z)}. Let X2 be its com-
plement {∅}[MMM/xyz] \ X1. Define F : X2 → M as F (s) := F ′(s−x) and
G : X2 → M as G(s) := G′(s−x). Obviously F ′ is {x, z}-uniform and G′ is
{x, y}-uniform.
Does M,X2[F/u] |= ψ2(x, y, z, u)? Yes, because s ∈ X2[F/u] implies s ∈
{∅}[MMF ′M/yzux], and we already know that M, {∅}[MMF ′M/yzux] |=
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ψ2(x, y, z, u). Similarly, one can see that M,X2[G/u] |= ψ3(x, y, z, v).
11 Conclusions
In this paper we have classified, up to reduction closure, many of the synctactical
fragments of IF logic that are individuated by positive initial trees (see the
Table at the end). All the trees that we have examinated fall in the FO/NPC
dichotomy. So, the question whether positive initial trees respect the dichotomy
is still open.
Interestingly, we have found three patterns (GH2(∨), C2, C1) which ex-
press NP-complete problems even though they contain no Henkin nor signalling
quantifier patterns; and for all we know, there might still be other unrecognized
higher-order patterns (to be found among extensions of the GH1(∧), GH1(∨),
GH2(∧) and C1’ trees). All the corresponding descriptions we have found are
quite atypical; in particular, they can be easily translated into H12 sentences (H
1
2
being the smallest, four-place Henkin quantifier) but not into F12 sentences (F
1
2
being the smallest function quantifier, see [25]).
For what regards trees of low complexity, our theorem on modest trees (6.16)
together with further results on generalized Henkin trees (8.3 and 8.4) and coor-
dinated trees of the second kind (10.1, 10.2), provides a rather general sufficient
(and effective) criterion for an IF sentence to have first-order expressive power,
extending the primality test of Sevenster, which in turn generalized the Knowl-
edge Memory test ([1]) and the Perfect Recall test ([27]). A different criterion for
first-orderness is given by checking the absence of broken signalling sequences, in
the sense of [1]; however, a moment of thought shows that this is also a special
case of the modest tree criterion. Sufficient, effective criteria for first-orderness
have an interest because recognizing the IF sentences (resp. ESO sentences,
etc.) that are equivalent to first-order ones is an undecidable problem15.
The present results can be seen as a step forward in the understanding of
fragments of IF logic. Future work should be addressed to a more systemati-
cal undestanding of the classes GH1, GH2(∧) and C1’-C6’, although it is not
clear whether a complete and satisfying classification is possible. Further work
might be directed at relaxing the requirement of regularity that we imposed on
trees, or at finding exact characterizations of the expressive power of fragments
(not just up to reduction closure). Thirdly, it might be interesting to investigate
what happens abandoning the restriction that trees be positive initial; although,
15It seems to be problematic to find an easy proof of this fact in the literature (but see [5]);
for completeness, we sketch one proof for ESO here. One has to show that from decidability of
this problem, the decidability of the satisfiability problem of first-order logic would follow. Let
M be an algorithm that decides our problem. Pick a first-order sentence ϕ (w.l.o.g., without
function symbols); this is satisfiable iff the empty signature sentence ∃Rϕ is (~R being a listing
of all the distinct relation symbols of ϕ). Apply M to ∃Rϕ. If it answers “yes”, one can find
(by systematical search) a first-order χ equivalent to ∃Rϕ. But χ has empty signature, so its
satisfiability problem is decidable ([26]). If instead M answers “no”, ∃Rϕ is not equivalent to
any first-order sentence, in particular to no contradiction, and so it is satisfiable.
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surely in this case a satisfying classification is impossible (a complete classifi-
cation of synctactical trees would yield in particular a sufficient and necessary
criterion of first-orderness – which, as we said, is an undecidable problem). One
interesting example, in this sense, is the tree
∀~x∃α∀~z(∃µ/{~x, α})((α = 0 ∨ α = 1) ∧ (µ = 0 ∨ µ = 1) ∧ [ ])
which is equivalent to the smallest of the so-called partially ordered connectives.
By results of [2], it follows that this tree is NL-complete, a possibility that, so
far, we have not individuated among positive initial trees.
A fourth direction of work might be the analysis of logics similar to IF ,
such as the system IF ∗, which also allows slashed connectives, or Dependence-
friendly logic, or their extensions via generalized quantifiers (see [9]). We also
hope that the understanding of fragments of IF logic might be of help in the
undestanding of other logics that cover NP, and that are structurally very dif-
ferent. One example is given by the logics of imperfect information based on
atoms; for these, an approach based on prefixes has perhaps little meaning, since
their higher-order expressive power is in part generated at the level of atomic
formulas. The other main example is, of course, existential second-order logic;
in particular, its functional version, for which a prefix approach only yields a
trivializing dichotomy.
In the following pages, a table summarizes all that we know about positive
initial tree prefixes. As a convention, if T is the name of a specific tree, we refer
to its extensions∗ to mean trees that extend T and do not fall in any other of
the categories described in the table.
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Tree Lower bound Upper bound
Henkin
∀x∃y∀z(∃w/{x, y}),
∀x∀z(∃y/z)(∃w/{x, y})
and their extensions
NP-complete (3-COLORING) NP
Signaling
∀x∃z(∃y/x)
and its extensions
NP-complete
(EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS,
SAT, DOMINATING SET)
NP
Generalized Henkin
GH1(∧): ∀x
∧
∀y
(∃v/x)
[ ]
(∃u/y)
[ ]
and its disjunction-free
extensions∗
FO
GH2(∧): ∀x
∀y
∧
(∃v/x)
[ ]
(∃u/y)
[ ]
and its disjunction-free
extensions∗
FO
GH1(∨): ∀x
∨
∀y
(∃v/x)
[ ]
(∃u/y)
[ ]
and its conjunction-free
extensions∗
FO
Extensions∗ of GH1(∧),
GH2(∧) and GH1(∨)
??? ???
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GH2(∨):
∀x
∀y
∨
(∃v/x)
[ ]
(∃u/y)
[ ]
and its extensions
NP-complete (SAT) NP
Coordinated
C1: ∀x
∨
∀y
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x)
[ ]
and its extensions
NP-complete (SET SPLITTING) NP
C2: ∀x
∀y
∨
(∃u/x)
[ ]
∀z
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
and its extensions
NP-complete (SAT) NP
C6’: ∀x
∀y
∀z
∨
[ ] ∧
(∃u/x, z)
[ ]
(∃v/x, y)
[ ]
and C1’-C5’, obtained
pushing ∀y,∀z below ∧ or ∨
FO
Extensions∗ of C1’-C6’ ??? ???
Modest (everything else) FO
47
References
[1] F. Barbero, On existential declarations of independence in IF logic, The
Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2013) 254–280.
[2] A. Blass, Y. Gurevich, Henkin quantifiers and complete problems, Annals
of Pure and Applied Logic 32 (1986) 1–16.
[3] X. Caicedo, F. Dechesne, T. M. V. Janssen, Equivalence and quantifier
rules for logic with imperfect information, Logic Journal of the IGPL 17
(2009) 91–129.
[4] P. Cameron, W. Hodges, Some combinatorics of imperfect information,
Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (2001) 673–684.
[5] L. A. Chagrova, An undecidable problem in correspondence theory, J. Sym-
bolic Logic 56 (4) (1991) 1261–1272.
[6] A. Durand, J. Kontinen, N. de Rugy-Altherre, J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Tractability
frontier of data complexity in team semantics, pre-print, arXiv:1509.06858.
[7] T. Eiter, G. Gottlob, Y. Gurevich, Existential second-order logic over
strings, J. ACM 47 (1) (2000) 77–131.
[8] T. Eiter, G. Gottlob, T. Schwentick, The model checking problem for prefix
classes of second-order logic: a survey, vol. 6300 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 227–250.
[9] F. Engstro¨m, Generalized quantifiers in Dependence Logic, Journal of
Logic, Language and Information 21 (2012) 299–324.
[10] R. Fagin, Generalized first-order spectra and polynomial-time recognizable
sets, Complexity of Computation, ed. R. Karp, SIAM-AMS Proceedings 7
(1974) 27–41.
[11] P. Galliani, Inclusion and exclusion dependencies in team semantics - on
some logics of imperfect information, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic
163 (1) (2012) 68–84.
[12] M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the
Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman & Co., New York, NY, USA,
1979.
[13] G. Gottlob, P. G. Kolaitis, T. Schwentick, Existential second-order logic
over graphs: Charting the tractability frontier, Journal of the Association
for Computing Machinery 51 (2000) 664–674.
[14] E. Gra¨del, J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Dependence and independence, Studia Logica 101
(2013) 399–410.
48
[15] E. Grandjean, First-order spectra with one variable, Journal of Computer
and System Sciences 40 (1990) 136153.
[16] L. Henkin, Some remarks on infinitely long formulas, in: Infinitistic meth-
ods, Pergamon Press, Oxford-London-New York-Paris, 1961.
[17] J. Hintikka, G. Sandu, Informational independence as a semantical phe-
nomenon, in: J. E. Fenstad et al (ed.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy
of Science VIII, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1989, pp. 571–589.
[18] W. Hodges, Compositional semantics for a language of imperfect informa-
tion, Logic Journal of the IGPL 5 (1997) 539–563.
[19] W. Hodges, Some strange quantifiers, in: J. Mycielski, G. Rozenberg, A. Sa-
lomaa (eds.), Structures in Logic and Computer Science. Lecture Notes in
Computer Sci. vol.1261, Springer-Verlag London, UK, 1997, pp. 51–65.
[20] T. M. V. Janssen, Independent choices and the interpretation of IF logic,
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (2002) 367–387.
[21] J. Kontinen, A. Kuusisto, J. Virtema, Decidability of Predicate Logics with
Team Semantics, in: P. Faliszewski, A. Muscholl, R. Niedermeier (eds.),
41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer
Science (MFCS 2016), vol. 58 of Leibniz International Proceedings in
Informatics (LIPIcs), Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik,
Dagstuhl, Germany, 2016.
[22] J. A. Kontinen, Coherence and complexity in fragments of dependence
logic, Ph.D. thesis, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (2010).
[23] J. A. Kontinen, Coherence and computational complexity of quantifier-free
dependence logic formulas, Studia Logica 101 (2013) 267–291.
[24] M. Krynicki, M. Mostowski, Henkin quantifiers, in: M. Krynicki,
M. Mostowski, L. Szczerba (eds.), Quantifiers: Logics, Models and Com-
putation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 193–263.
[25] M. Krynicki, J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Henkin and function quantifiers, Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic 43 (3) (1989) 273 – 292.
[26] L. Lo¨wenheim, U¨ber mo¨glichkeiten im relativkalku¨l, Mathematische An-
nalen 76 (1915) 447470, translated as “On possibilities in the calculus of
relatives” in Jean van Heijenoort, 1967. A Source Book in Mathematical
Logic, 18791931, Harvard Univ. Press: 228251.
[27] A. L. Mann, G. Sandu, M. Sevenster, Independence-Friendly Logic - a
Game-Theoretic Approach, vol. 386 of London Mathematical Society lec-
ture note series, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[28] V. Nurmi, Dependence Logic: Investigations into higher-order semantics
defined on teams, Ph.D. thesis, University of Helsinki (2009).
49
[29] G. Sandu, On the logic of informational independence and its applications,
Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (1993) 29–60.
[30] G. Sandu, J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Partially ordered connectives, Mathematical Logic
Quarterly 38 (1) (1992) 361–372.
[31] M. Sevenster, Dichotomy result for independence-friendly prefixes of gener-
alized quantifiers, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 79(04) (2014) 1224–1246.
[32] T. Tantau, Existential second-order logic over graphs: A complete
complexity-theoretic classification, in: 32nd International Symposium
on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2015), Volume
30 of Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Schloss
Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fr Informatik, 2015.
[33] J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, On the semantics of informational independence, Logic Jour-
nal of the IGPL 10 (2002) 337–350.
[34] J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Dependence Logic: A New Approach to Independence
Friendly Logic, vol. 70 of London Mathematical Society Student Texts,
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[35] J. Virtema, Approaches to finite variable dependence, Ph.D. thesis, Uni-
versity of Tampere (2014).
50
